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This dissertation contains four essays in economics with imperfect compe-
tition. Each of these essays is self-contained and can be read separately. At
first glance, they seem to be completely unrelated to one other. This General
Introduction points out the main methodological relationships between the es-
says. It also offers the reader a compact background of the related literature,
explains its main issues, and provides a short list of its most important results.
Finally, it contains a short summary of the essays of the dissertation.
To begin with the methodological similarities, all essays adopt the partial
equilióriu~n approach. That is, a consumer's welfare is well-captured by the
notion of consum.er surpdus. In other words, the essays assume that there are
no income-effects. Second, essays one to three deal with imperfect competition
and differentiated products. Use will be made of two well-known models in the
spatial-differentiation tradition: the linear model and the circular model. These
two models allow to formally analyze the concepts of product differentiation.
Essays one and three combine the concepts of horizontal and vertical product
differentiation. Essay two, however, only treats horizontal differentiation. In
contrast with essays one and three, the second essay focuses on rrzonopolistic
competition. In addition, it combines localized and non-localized competition.
1
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There are, however, also some methodological differences between the four
essays. First, essays one to three use non-cooperative solution concepts, while
essay four makes use of a cooperative solution concept. Second, although all
essays deal with price competition, essays one to three presume price commit-
ment while essay four takes a bargaining approach. In other words, the essays
with price commitment assume that the sellers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Hence, consumers have no bargaining power. Essay four, by contrast, treats
sellers and consumers symmetrically in that both are given the same amount of
bargaining power.
Section 1.1 of this General Introduction discusses the partial equilibrium
approach and the notion of consumer surplus as a measure for the consumer's
welfare. A short motivation for models with price competition is given in Section
1.2. The two strands of literature in the economics of product differentiation are
treated quite extensively in Section 1.3. At the end of that section, the set-ups
and central results of essays one to three are presented. Section 1.4 discusses
the differences between price commitment and negotiated pricing, addresses the
main issues of bargaining in markets, and highlights the essential differences
between the cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining approach. That last
section also contains the set-up and main insights of the fourth essay.
1.1 The Partial Equilibrium Approach and Con-
sumer Surplus.
General Equilibrium Theory studies the interdependencies between markets in
an economy. It takes all prices in the economy as variables. In a Walrasian
equilibrium, it is required that prices clear all markets. That is, in such an
equilibrium, the value of the excess demand equals zero. General Equilibrium
Theory proves useful in examining how a change in one market leads to a new
general equilibrium in a1l markets: an increase in the tax on labor may positively
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effect demand in the market for capital; an increase in the tax on the net income
of corporations may well have a negative effect on the return on investment in
the non-corporate sector. The message of general equilibrium theory is clear:
ignoring the effects of a change in one market to other markets may imply
incorrect conclusions and, therefore, be misleading.
Partial Equilibrium Analysis, in contrast, offers a single-market approach
in that a good is singled out while ignoring any interaction with the rest of
the economy. The partial equilibrium approach has its merits in examining
problems when the effect of a price increase, say on staples, only negligibly
affects demand for other goods: although the price increase reduces the demand
for staples, its effects on other goods are spread almost evenly. By consequence,
wage rates, return on capital, and consumption patterns are only negligibly
affected. The message of partial equilibrium analysis is equally clear: when a
price change in one market only negligibly affects the demand for other goods,
the marginal benefits of a general equilibrium analysis not necessarily outweigh
its marginal costs. In that case, the partial equilibrium approach may offer a
good approximation of the problem at hand. The simplifying partial equilibrium
analysis also allows to incorporate elements that may increase the degree of
realism of the model.
Economists are not only interested in how markets are related to each other
(general equilibrium) or how these function in isolation ( partial equilibrium).
That is, they are not only concerned with positive analysis. They are also inter-
ested in how the effect of a price change affects consumer welfare and producer
profits. An appropriate measure for welfare change determines whether the
price change should be carried out or not. In other words, economists are also
interested in normative analysis. In partial equilibrium analysis, the effect of a
price change on consumer's welfare is typically measured by the (Marshallian)
consumer surplus. That is, a monetary measure defined by the area to the
left of the (Marshallian) demand function between two prices. This demand
function depends on prices and income. It is important to mention that this
way of ineasuring the change in the consumer's welfare only makes sense under
4 Chapter 1
specific conditions. In particular, this measure for the change in the consumer's
welfare is appropriate when there are no income-effects. This is the case when
(i) income is sufTiciently high, and (ii) the rest of the economy can be treated
as an aggregate numéraire that linearly enters the consumer's utility. In other
words, the price change only affects the demand for that particular good and
can, therefore, be analysed in isolation.
This dissertation takes the partial equilibrium approach and ignores any
income effects. The conclusions, therefore, should be interpreted from a per-
spective where the goods purchased only constitute a small fraction of the total
income level. That is, small price changes will have (almost) no effect on the
demand for other goods.
1.2 Price Competition.
In the Walrasian competitive framework the economic agents are price takers.
This framework, however, does not explicitly model how the economic agents
interact. The formation of prices is not modelled as a result of some interaction
between these economic agents. Rather, markets are the level of analysis. As
a deus ex machina, the Walrasian auctioneer clears the markets by equating
demand and supply. Cournot (1838) proposed a model where sellers interact
with each other. With quantities as the strategic variable, each firm maximizes
its profit given the quantities chosen by all other firms. Still, an auctioneer has
to determine the market clearing price. Bertrand (1883) criticized Cournot's
model and claimed that the use of prices instead of quantities was strategically
advantageous for firms. He argued that by charging a somewhat lower price than
all other sellers, one single seller could attract the whole market. Bertrand's
model allowed for an explicit treatment of interaction between the economic
agents. In addition, there was no role anymore for a Walrasian auctioneer to
determine the market clearing price. Finally, already with two price-setting
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firms whose marginal costs are identical and constant, Bertrand's model re-
sulted in the competitive outcome. Bertrand's result has become known as
the Bertrand paradox, for this result - that already with two firms, having
identical and constant marginal costs, perfect competition emerges - seems
too strongly to be taken as a"reasonable" way of modelling price competition
between firms. Several ways out have been proposed by relaxing some of the
assumptions in Bertrand's model. Edgeworth (1897) introduced the idea of ca-
pacity constraints. He concluded that for intermediate capacity constraints a
price equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. For small enough capaci-
ties and efficient rationing, however, the Bertrand approach coincides with the
Cournot model. In other words, in some cases the Cournot model can be in-
terpreted as a reduced form of a two-stage game where two firms choose their
capacities in the first stage and compete in prices in the second stage. This has
been shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Use of the Cournot model as
a reduced form, however, must be made with caution as e.g. the staging of a
game has important implications for the players' optimal strategies (see Tirole,
1988). Another way out of the Bertrand paradox is related to the aspect of time.
Bertrand's model takes place in a timeless world. By allowing time to play a role
in the modelling, repeated interaction between firms opens the possibility of an
equilibrium with prices above marginal cost (see Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986).
Finally, Bertrand's model is concerned with homogeneous goods. The introduc-
tion of differentiated goods, as we will see in the next section, softens the degree
of competition and provides another way out of the Bertrand-paradox. Essays
one to three of the dissertation use Bertrand-competition with differentiated
products as a framework of analysis.
1.3 The Economics of Product Diíferentia-
tion.
Essays one to three deal with topics in the economics of product differentiation.
Products are said to be horizontally differentiated when at equal prices not all
consumers necessarily rank the products in the same way. In contrast, with ver-
6 Chapter 1
tica.lly differentiated products all consumers do rank products in the same way
when their prices equal. Essays one to three make use of two well-known models
in the economics of product differentiation: the linear and the circular model.
The literature that has emerged out of these two models uses the framework
of spatial competition. Within this paradigm, consumers as well as products
can be regarded as points in some characteristics space (see Lancaster (1979)
and Hotelling (1929)). The theory of spatial competition is mainly concerned
with: (i) the strategic aspects of firms' product positioning in this characteris-
tics space and (ii) price competition. The concepts of horizontal and vertical
product differentiation are central in this literature. Since these concepts are
used throughout essays one to three, Section 1.3.1 explains their meaning and
highlights their different ímpact on the equilibrium market structure.
The second subfield has come to be known as monopolistic competition.
Traditionally, it started off with Chamberlin's (1933) `large-group' industry of
non-localized competition where every firm directly competes in a symmetric
fashion with all other firms. Kaldor (1935), however, criticized Chamberlin's
idea and thought of localized competition: each firm only competes in a direct
way with some but not all other firms. The study of this second subfield in
the economics of product differentiation, however, does not focus on strategic
aspects. It is mainly interested in whether a free market economy with differen-
tiated products will offer the socially right number of product diversity. Essay
two makes use of this framework and combines the idea of non-localized and
localized competition. Section 1.3.2, therefore, scans its most important issues.
Section 1.3.3 offers a short summary of the horizontal and vertical differentia-
tion set-up used in essays one to three. In addition, it also presents the main
insights of these three essays.
1.3.1 Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation.
In Bertrand's (1883) model of price competition with homogeneous goods (see
Section 1.2), no firm can charge a price above marginal cost without losing
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its total market share: cross-price elasticities equal infinity at identical prices
and zero at non-identical prices. Homogeneous goods, however, are more the
exception than the rule. The picture changes drastically when products are
difFerentiated. In Chamberlin's words:
"A general class of product is differentiated if any significant ba-
sis exists for distinguishing the goods (or services) of one seller from
those of another. Such a basis may be real or fancied, so long as it is
of any importance whatever to buyers, and leads to a preference for
one variety of the product to another. Where such differentiation
exists, even though it be slight, buyers will be paired with sellers,
not by chance and ad random (as under pure competition), but ac-
cording to their preferences. Differentiation may be based upon cer-
tain characteristics of the product itself, such as exclusive patented
features; trade marks; trade names; peculiarities of the package or
container, if any; or singularity in quality; design, color, or style. It
may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding its sale.
In retail trade, to take only one instance, these conditions include
such factors as the convenience to the seller's location, the general
tone or character of his establishment, his way of doing business,
his reputation for fair dealing courtesy, efficiency, and all the per-
sonal links which attach his customers either to himself or to those
employed by him. In so far as these and other intangible factors
vary from seller to seller, the "product" in each case is different, for
buyers take them into account, more or less, and may be regarded
as purchasing them along with the commodity itself. When these
two aspects of differentiation are held in mind it is evident that vir-
tually all products are differentiated, at least slightly, and that, over
a wide range of economic activity, differentiation is of considerable
importance." (Chamberlin, 1933, pp. 56-57)
Hotelling was one of the first to systematically study the effects of physical
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and less tangible components of products on price competition. In his seminal
paper, Hotelling (1929) recognized that
"if a seller increases his price too far he will gradually lose busi-
ness to his rivals, but does not lose all his trade instantly when he
raises his price only a trifle. Many customers will still prefer to trade
with him because they live nearer to his store than the others...or be-
cause he is a fellow Elk or Baptist, or on account of some differences
in service or quality, or for a combination of reasons" (Hotelling, p.
44 and as quoted in Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992).
In Hotelling's model, consumers are uniformly distributed on some interval with
unit length. There are two sellers who compete in prices. Each offers the same
physical good; seller A has his store located at the left extreme of the interval
while seller B has his location at the other extreme. Consumers derive some sur-
plus from consuming the good. The distance between a seller's store and some
consumer then has a natural interpretation. It represents the transportation
cost a consumer incurs from going to the store. (In an alternative setting, the
sellers' location defines the variant of some good and distance then represents
the difference between the consumer's most favoured taste (his location) and
the product's taste.) The distance, therefore, implies a loss in the consumer's
utility. This loss together with the price of the good will determine whether a
consumer prefers seller A to B or not. The cost of transportation clearly can
be regarded as, in Chamberlin's words, something that is purchased along with
the good. Thus, although the goods are physically identical, consumers regard
the goods as differentiated because of this cost of transportation. The degree of
differentiation increases with the cost of transportation. When this cost equals
zero, goods are homogeneous and Bertrand's result appears. Hotelling's model
concerns horizontal product differentiation: at equal prices consumers do not
necessarily rank products in the same way; some prefer store A to store B while
others rank the stores in the opposite way.
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Hotelling also allowed the stores to choose their location (stage 1) before
competing in prices (stage 2). The questions Hotelling tried to answer were:
given each store's location, what prices constitute a situation in which no store
can improve its profits given the other store's price. That is, what is the Nash
equilibrium of the pricing-game. Having solved that problem, what choice
of location could constitute a situation in which no store could improve its
profit given the other's location. In other words, what is the (Subgame Perfect)
equilibrium' of the location game. In more general terms, this is a two-stage
game with observed actions2: firms simultaneously take an action in each stage.
Knowing each other's choice of action of the first stage, each firm chooses an ac-
tion in the second stage of the game. These models use the concept of Subgame
Perfect equilibrium to solve the multi-stage game. This concept is due to Selten
(1965, 1975), although authors such as Hotelling (1929) implicitly made use of
it. It requíres that the players should play according to a Nash equilibrium at
each stage of the game. In a Nash equilibrium, no player finds it profitable to
unilaterally deviate given the other players' actions. Hence, a Subgame Perfect
equilibrium concept rules out that players make incredible threats.
The location choices influence not only the store's demand (the demand ef-
fect) but also the intensity of price competition: competition in price becomes
more agressive when stores are located closer to each other (the strategic effect).
Hotelling's analysis resulted in his famous "principle of minimum differentia-
tion" in which the two stores choose exactly the same location. His analysis
turned out to be incorrect as shown by d'Aspremont et al. (1979). They proved
that with linear transportation costs, an equilibrium (in pure strategies) of
the pricing-game does not exist when stores are located at non-identical and
sufficiently close locations. In addition, they showed that with quadratic trans-
portation costs the two stores locate at the two extremes of the unit interval,
thereby establishing the "principle of maximal differentiation". This principle
is the result of two opposing effects. The first effect moves the firm to the center
in order to increase its demand (the demand effect). This movement, however,
1 See below for more on this equilibrium concept.
ZSee Fhdenberg and Tirole (1991).
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enhances the degree of price competition (the strategic effect) as both firms be-
come less and less differentiated from each other. With quadratic transportation
costs, the strategic effect always dominates the demand effect. Therefore, both
locate as far as possible from each other. The results of Hotelling's paradigm,
therefore, heavily depend on the properties of the transportation costs (see An-
derson, De Palma, and Thisse 1992).
In models with horizontal product differentiation, consumers do not rank
the available products unanimously when sold at the same price. This need not
always be the case. There is vertical product differentiation if heterogeneous
consumers unanimously rank products at equal prices since all prefer higher to
lower quality. Mussa and Rosen (1978) showed that a monopolist enlarges the
quality spectrum as a device to discriminate consumers with a high willingness
to pay for quality from others who value quality less. In an oligopolistic context,
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) analysed
how the market equilibrium would look like when firms offer vertically differ-
entiated products. Shaked and Sutton (1982) use a multi-stage game where
firms first choose whether to enter the market or not. In the second stage, they
decide on quality. In the last stage, they compete in prices.3 The unit cost of
production is assumed to be constant and the level of quality is costless. On the
consumers' side, consumers are ranked according to their `taste for quality', and
it is assumed that all consumers buy one of the available brands. In addition,
consumers should be sufficiently heterogeneous with respect to their `taste for
quality': this guarantees the lowest quality firm a positive market share. Shaked
and Sutton (1982) demonstrated that in a Subgame Perfect equilibrium, firms
tend to differentiate themselves maximally from each other in order to relax
price competition. In other words, the strategic effect dominates the demand
effect. As a result, in equilibrium only two firms enter the market: one firm
picks the highest quality while another selects the lowest quality. Consumers
with a low (high) `taste for quality' purchase from the low (high) quality firm.
3Shaked and Sutton's (1982) article is one of the first contributions on product differenti-
ation, if not the first, that explicitly refers to Selten's (1975) equilibrium concept.
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Two remarks should be made. First, the result of maximal differentiation
is a direct result of the assumption that every consumer buys one unit. That
is, the consumer with the lowest taste for quality should receive non-negative
utility from purchasing the lowest quality good. If not, the low quality firm
cannot serve any consumer, unless increasing its quality. Second, if there is
no sufficient heterogeneity on the consumers' side, the low quality firm cannot
locate herself far enough from the high quality firm. This leads to very tough
price competition such that the low quality firm cannot attract any demand.
The high quality firm, however, charges a price above marginal cost and makes
positive profits. In other words, the principle of differentiation is a robust
result. This is in sharp contrast with models of horizontal differentiation. There,
costless entry guarantees every entering firm a positive demand.
In a more general framework, Shaked and Sutton (1983) have shown the
"finiteness result" for models with vertical product difterentiation: high quality
firms, through competition in prices, throw low quality firms out of the market.
This yields a finite upperbound on the number of firms under free entry if the
unit cost of production increases slowly enough with the increase in quality.
This is in sharp contrast with models of horizontal difFerentiation, where the
number of firms approaches infinity when the cost of entry becomes negligible.
Recently, models have appeared that allow for location choice both in vari-
ety and quality. Neven and Thisse (1990) combine the horizontal and vertical
product differentiation model on the Hotelling line. They analyse a duopoly
and obtain two kinds of results. Horizontal dominance is said to occur when
relative to the horizontal differences of the two products, its vertical character-
istics are "closer" to each other. Vertical dominance occurs when the opposite
relationship holds. Similar combinations of both horizontal and vertical prod-
uct differentiation have been carried out by Economides (1989) and Tabuchi
(1994).
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1.3.2 Monopolistic Competition: Localized and Non-
localized Competition.
The main theme of the literature on spatial competition is strategic positioning
and price competítion. In contrast, research in monopolistic competition takes
product differentiation as a given and, therefore, ensures every firm some degree
of market power. The central theme is: does the market províde an efficient
degree of variety in a free-entry equilibrium? Such an equilibrium is said to
exist if existing firms earn non-negative profits and any other entering firm
anticipates its profits to be non-positive. Measuring the efficiency loss of a
free-entry market outcome is the major theme of this literature.
The literature on monopolistic competition consists of two research strands.
The first is due to Chamberlin: all firms operating in the industry compete
with one another in a more or less symmetric fashion. With many firms, a price
change by one firm has only a negligible effect in the demand of every other
firm. Chamberlin (1933) states:
"A price cut, for instance, which increases the sales of him who
made it, draws inappreciable amounts from the markets of each of
his many competitors, achieving a considerable result for the one
who cut, but without making incursions upon the market of any
single competitor sufficient to cause him to do anything he would
not have done anyway" (Chamberlin, 1933, p. 83, and as quoted in
Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992).
In more modern terminology, the Chamberlinian approach has been called non-
localized competition. Leading models in this literature are Spence (1976) and
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who use the representative consumer approach and
Perloff and Salop (1985). The latter take a linear random utility model to
describe the consumer's demand for differentiated products.
The second strand of literature started off with Kaldor (1935). He criticized
the Chamberlinian approach. Kaldor's approach is most easily illustrated with
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Salop's (1979) circle model. In this model, a circle represents the product
space. A given number of firms is positioned equidistantly on this circle. Their
position defines the product's variant. Consumers are distributed along this
circle and their position coincides exactly with their most preferred variant. For
given prices, a small price change by one firm only affects its two neighbouring
firms. In other words, the non-neigbouring firms are not affected at all by
this small price-cut. Firms, therefore, compete only in a local fashion. This
effect of a price change goes to the heart of the Kaldorian approach. In more
modern terminology, there is localized competition. It is, indeed, fundamentally
different from the Chamberlinian approach where every firm competes with
every other firm. The consumer's point of view is also illustrative to point
at the difference between the two approaches. In the Kaldorian approach, a
consumer's position on the circle perfectly reveals his preference ordering for
all variants. For example, at equal prices the variant at the shortest arc-length
is the most preferred one, followed by the variant at the second shortest arc-
length, and so on. In the Chamberlinian approach, however, no such inferences
can be made: a consumer's most preferred brand does not yield any information
about his second preferred one. Recently, Deneckere and Rothschild (1992) have
provided a way to integrate these two approaches into one model.
The above (implicitly) presumed a given number of firms in the industry.
Such a presumption is more suited for a short-run analysis. As mentioned above,
the common theme of the two approaches, however, is to focus on free-entry for
firms; a long-run phenomenon. That is, when no existing firm wants to leave
the market and no other firm wants to enter.
Adding this zero-profit condition to the Chamberlinian approach, one arrives
at "monopolistic competition". The total number of products is the result of
two effects trading off each other (Spence, 1976). The first can be identified
as the "non-appropriability of socia] surplus" effect. Although from a social
point of view it may be optimal to introduce a product, the firm's impossibility
to first-degree price discriminate may lead him not to enter the market. This
negatively affects the diversity of products. The other effect is the "business
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stealing" effect. Stealing consumers from a rival firm may be without yielding
any additional social surplus. This effect tends to generate too many products.
In the context of non-localized competition, no clear-cut general result about
too few or too many products exists; the specificities of the model determine
whether there is excess diversity or not. If, for example, the preference for
variety is suíficiently large, a free-entry market economy will generate too few
products.
The adding of the zero-profit condition to the Kaldorian approach, however,
always yields too many products in the free-entry equilibrium. Norman and
Thisse (1994) offer an intuitive interpretation for the main insight offered by
the literature on monopolistic competition:
"In the [Chamberlinian] approach each firm is in competition
with all other firms, while in the [Kaldorian] model each firm com-
petes directly only with its immediate neighbours. Hence, for a
given number of firms the equilibrium price should be lower and
equilibrium should be characterized by less entry in the former case
than in the latter." (Norman and Thisse, 1994, The Econonzics of
Product Differentíation)
The Chamberlinian `large group' competition assumes many firms, each with
negligible market power (in the sense that a particular firm's actions do not
affect other firms' payoffs) but offer a differentiated commodity so that their
demand is downward sloping or has finite elasticity. This absence of strategic
behavior has been motivated to simplify the analysis while focusing on the
variety of products offered. Recently, Anderson et al. (1995) have offered a
model of Chamberlinian competition that allows for strategic behavior between
firms. Their analysis has shown that the free-entry equilibrium results in too
many firms vis-à-vis the socially optimal product diversity.
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1.3.3 Summary of the Essays with Product Differenti-
at ion
Essays one to three make use of the two basic models of spatial competition.
This approach offers a framework that can explain optimal business-strategies;
that is, optimal product positioning and price setting behavior. The first essay
Phonebanking studies under what conditions banks offer phonebanking (first
stage). The banks compete for the deposits of consumers located along a circle.
The location of the banks is exogenously fixed. At a phonebank, depositors can
exercise some financial transactions by phone. Using the phone option has the
same cost for every depositor. In this first stage, banks decide about the quality
of their product. This essay, therefore, combines both horizontal and vertical
differentiation. In the second stage, banks are competitors in the market for
deposits. Offering the phone option creates two opposing effects. The first is
a demand effect as depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial
transactions by phone. The second (strategic) effect is that competition is
increased as transaction costs are lowered. No bank offers the phone option
if the strategic effect dominates. 5pecialization can occur in that one bank
offers the phone option while the other does not. It requires a relatively large
demand effect and a moderate strategic effect. Finally, both banks offer the
phone option when the demand effect dominates the strategic effect. It leads to
tougher price competition than a situation without phonebanking. This essay
is based on: Bouckaert, J. and H. Degryse (1995), Phonebanking, European
Economic Review, 39, 229-244.
The second essay Monopolistic Competition with a Mail Order Busi-
ness studies a market in which firms can choose to sell either by a retail store
or by a mail order business. For the consumer, purchases made at retail stores
entail transportation costs that increase with distance. In contrast, a consumer
served by a mail order business pays a fixed cost, irrespective of his or her
location. This essay concentrates on two issues. First, in a strategic context
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it studies how firms will market their product (spatial competition). Second,
it also looks at the free-entry equilibrium number of firms. In the free-entry
equilibrium, at most one mail order business emerges. Moreover, the mail order
business competes in a non-localized fashion with all stores. The retail stores,
however, compete in a localized way with the mail order business. This essay,
therefore, contributes to combining issues of the non-localized and localized tra-
dition. Compared to the circle-model without mail order business, fewer firms
are active in the free-entry mail order business equilibrium. In consequence,
competition becomes more fierce. In contrast with the free-entry case, the so-
cial planner never opens both stores and a mail order business at the same
time.
The third essay studies Price Competition between an Expert and a
Non-expert. As in essay one, it deals with horizontal and vertical product
differentíation. The expert is located at the right extreme of the interval and
the non-expert at the left extreme. Consumers are uniformly distributed along
the unit interval. They require a successful repair and seek to minimize their
expected expenditure. The expert always repairs successfully. The non-expert's
repair technology, however, is imperfect: he successfully repairs only with some
probability. In addition, if the repair fails, a next visit at the non-expert's store
always results in failure. A consumer who visits the non-expert anticipates he
will re-enter the market as a"failure" if the repair was unsuccessful. From
the characteristics of the non-expert's repair technology, the only choice left for
this "failure" is to visit the expert's store. Essentially, the expert's choice is
either to serve only failures or not. If the expert serves only failures, demand
becomes inelastic and it is optimal to charge the monopoly price. For suffii-
ciently high probabilities of successful repair at the non-expert's store, it is not
optimal for the expert to serve only failures as this market becomes very small.
The expert, therefore, adopts an "agressive-pricing" strategy. By consequence,
some consumers directly visit the expert. This equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Otherwise, the expert uses a mixed strategy. In this "mixed-pricing" equilib-
rium the expert charges with some probability a low price. With the remaining
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probability, he charges the monopoly price. In that event, all consumers first
visit the non-expert. The welfare analysis shows that when the expert incurs
a cost-disadvantage, the market outcome in pure strategies results in too many
consumers directly visiting the expert. The opposite occurs without cost differ-
ences.
1.4 Price Commitment and Bargaining in Mar-
kets.
The Bertrand model (see Section 1.2) assumes that sellers can commit them-
selves to a price. Therefore, buyers have no power in determining the price. To
put it in another way, buyers have no bargaining power since prices are set on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The Bertrand assumption of price commitment, however, has serious draw-
backs. One of these drawbacks is that the concept of Bertrand competition
implies counterintuitive results as Diamond (1971) has shown. He introduced
a model where, in contrast with Bertrand's model, buyers are imperfectly in-
formed about the seller's price. That is, they have to incur a strictly positive
search cost to get informed about the seller's price. In that model, it turns out
that even when search costs are negligibly small (but positive) and the number
of sellers becomes very large the equilibrium price equals the monopoly price.4
This has come to be known as the Diamond- or monopoly-paradox. As in the
Bertrand-paradox, it seems too strong to be taken as a"reasonable" way of
modelling price competition between firms. Several ways out of this monopoly-
paradox have been proposed. Butters (1977) and Salop and Stiglitz (1977)
have introduced consumers that are informed about the price whereas others
4This version of Diamond's model assumes that consumers can costlessly visit the first
seller. This assumption is made to avoid that the consumers would not enter the market at
all.
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remained uninformed. In their settings, informed consumers exert a positive ex-
ternality on the uninformed while the uninformed exert a negative externality
on the informed. The interesting feature of these models is that price dispersion
can be explained in equilibrium. In addition, when the information uncertainty
about the prices vanishes, the perfectly competitive outcome emerges as the
outcome.
In contrast with price commitment, the concept of bargaining or negotiated
prícing gives the buyer some power in determining the price. This bargaining
approach undermines the seller's possibility of committing to a price. Thus,
the terms of trade are determined by negotiation. This framework weakens
the seller's market power and, in contrast with price commitment, allows for
a more symmetric treatment of both sides of the market.s Bester (1988) has
shown that the bargaining approach may serve as a tool of analysis to solve
the Diamond-paradox. In his model search costs imply imperfect information
about the quality of the good. When search costs become negligible small, the
buyer's uncertainty about the quality disappears and sellers' profits approach
zero. In this way, the competitive equilibrium is restored when market frictions
disappear.
Another drawback of price competition where sellers commit to a price is
that existence of an equilibrium is not always assured. As mentioned in Section
1.3, in case of linear transportation costs Hotelling's model of product differ-
entiation may fail to have a price equilibrium as shown by d'Aspremont et al.
(1979). When the two firms are located close enough to each other, both have an
incentive to slightly undercut the other. In Hotelling's model, the undercutting
firm then attracts the whole market. This practice can be done as long as profits
are positive. In a horizontal differentiation model, however, every firm can guar-
antee itself some market power. Therefore, a price equilibrium where one firm
obtains zero profits cannot exist. Bester (1989b) solves Hotelling's location-
price game in a negotiated pricing framework. In his bargaining framework,
SSee Bester (1989a) for a compact sutvey on non-cooperative bargaining and imperfect
competition.
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consumers can use their outside option as a threat to visit another seller. His
findings are that in the limit, when the degree of substitutability between the
stores increases, the competitive outcome is established. This result holds if
buyers can increase their speed of travelling between two stores to infinity or
when the number of sellers increases such that the equilibrium distance between
two stores becomes negligibly small.
In sharp contrast with the Walrasian framework, the general idea behind
bargaining in markets is to analyze markets where trade is decentralized. The
trading partners are assumed to be in a partial bilateral monopoly situation:
switching costs from one to the other trading partner rule out that multilateral
trade can take place. In the event the trading partners cannot reach an agree-
ment about the terms of trade, both can switch to another trading partner. The
level of the switching costs, therefore, will partly determine each trading part-
ner's bargaining position. This approach allows to explicitly analyze the effects
of market frictions on the equilibrium outcome of the market. In addition, it
may determine whether the equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive
one when the market frictions vanish. That is, a bargaining model may serve
as a foundation for the Walrasian equilibrium when the market frictions go to
zero.
Two approaches have been used to model the outcome of the bargaining.
The first is the Cooperative Bargaining Approach. It consists of a set of fea-
sible payoffs and a`status-quo' point. The most well-known solution concept
is the Nash-bargaining solution. This solution concept satisfies four axioms:
Pareto-efficiency, invariance to affine transformations of the utility functions,
symmetry, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Nash (1950) has shown
that these four axioms result in a unique outcome. The second approach is the
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Approach. In sharp contrast with the previous
(institutional-free) approach, this non-cooperative approach offers a precise de-
scription of the bargaining procedure. In other words, the institutional setting is
defined explicitly. It models the bargaining solution as an extensive game, and
uses a game theoretic solution concept (e.g. the Subgame Perfect equilibrium)
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to determine the outcome of the bargaining. As an example of such an exten-
sive game, take the alternating offers bargaining game (Rubinstein, 1982): two
impatient players, with diametrically opposed interests, must share a monetary
unit by making sequential, alternating offers. If the opponent accepts the offer,
the game ends. If he rejects the offer, he makes a counteroffer in the next stage of
the game, and so on. If no agreement can be reached, both receive zero. This is
a game of perfect information, and has a unique Subgame Perfect Nash equilib-
rium where agreement is reached immediately. The non-cooperative bargaining
approach has been used e.g. to explain markets with non-Walrasian outcomes
(see Shaked and Sutton (1984) who explain involuntary unemployment), and
to markets where outcomes with price commitment do not exist (see above).
The cooperative approach and the non-cooperative approach, however, need
not be inconsistent with each other. Recently, it has been shown by Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) that the Nash bargaining solution coincides
with the non-cooperative outcome of an alternating offers bargaining game in
which the probability of an exogenous breakdown vanishes.
1.4.1 Summary of Essay on Bargaining in Markets
Essay four of this dissertation studies Bargaining in Markets with Simul-
taneous and Sequential Suppliers. It uses the cooperative bargaining ap-
proach. This essay compares the Nash bargaining outcomes in two market
organizations where suppliers, e.g. taxi-drivers, wait at stand for customers to
arrive. At most one customer arrives per period of time. In the first market
organization (the random-market) suppliers simultaneously offer their good for
sale. Customers, upon arrival, may randomly select a supplier. If agreement
is reached, both partners symmetrically share the surplus. If there is disagree-
ment, customers may, in the next period, again randomly select a supplier, and
so on. In the second market organization (the FIFO-market) suppliers queue
and sequentially offer their good for sale. Upon arrival, customers have to
take the first supplier in the queue and, upon disagreement, stick to the same
supplier. Customers are involved in a partial bilateral monopoly in the random-
market. The FIFO-market, however, is characterized by a bilateral monopoly
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and, therefore, results in a higher outcome. When customers cannot choose
regime, the market equilibrium always has the property that there are suppli-
ers in both regimes. In the limit, when the number of suppliers becomes very
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Technological innovation over the past decade redesigned the art of competition
in banking. Recently, the innovation `phonebanking' appeared as a"banking
facility which can be accessed remotely by a customer via his or her telephone"
(Essinger, 1992, p.152). Phonebanking facilities include, for example, state-
ment and check book ordering, third party payments and up to date account
information.l The number of banks offering this kind of access has increased
substantially during the recent past. In Belgium, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and Sweden, virtually all major banks ofFer phonebanking. The per-
centage of these banks' depositors using this innovation ranges from 2 to 15 for
Belgium, 3 to 50 for France and 3 to 100 for the United Kingdom.2
In this chapter, depositors value a phonebank since it facilitates access to
their account. Using the phone option reduces their transaction costs to manage
their account. For example, it may lower their travelling costs. Therefore,
depositors are willing to accept lower deposit rates in order to become clients
at a phonebank.3
lA formally equivalent idea has already been in existence for some time: depositors use
envelopes to order their financial transactions by mail.
ZFor an overview of the importance of phonebanking, see BEUC (1992) and BIS (1993).
3Heffernan (1992) computes the interest equivalence for a list of nonprice characteristics
of bank products but excludes the phone option.
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The chapter considers a spatial duopoly. It analyzes whether banks will
offer phonebanking to their clients or not and what the effects upon their market
shares, deposit rates and profits will be. A deposit market with related financial
services is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, banks decide whether
to introduce the phone option or not. In the second stage, banks compete in
deposit rates. We apply a model related to the Salop (1979) circle model. At a
phonebank, depositors can exercise some financial transactions by phone. Using
the phone option has the same cost for every depositor. Graphically, the phone
option can be modelled as the center of a circle: the distance from the center
is the same for every point on the circle. 4 Each depositor, being a client at a
phonebank, has the opportunity to exercise some of his or her transactions at
a fixed cost.s
Offering the phone option has two opposite effects. First, it makes the bank
offering that option more attractive to depositors (demand effect). Second,
it encourages competition among banks as it implies lower transaction costs
(strategic effect). Banks do not offer the phone option (no phonebanking) if
the strategic effect dominates. Only one bank offering the phone option (spe-
cialization) requires a relatively large demand effect and a moderate strategic
effect. Two phonebanks (universal phonebanking) appear if the demand effect
overwhelms the strategic effect. Since universal phonebanking implies lower
transaction costs, it leads to tougher competition than no phonebanking.
Silber (1983) offers an overview of the process of financial innovations. His
main hypothesis is that "new financial practices are innovated to lessen the
financial constraints imposed on firms" (p.89). Both external and internal con-
straints are at the origin of their innovative activity. This chapter studies the
competitive effects of phonebanking as an option for clients to execute their
financial transactions when banks are competitors in the market for deposits.
4Henriet and Rochet (1991) consider a similar framework to analyze competition in the
distribution of insurance. Insurance intermediaries are located along the circle and a direct
writer is located at the center of the circle. The cost to approach the direct writer ia uniformly
high for all buyers of insurance (represented by the length of the radius).
SSome banks introduced a phone number per phone area. Therefore, the cost for a depos-
itor to use the phone option is the same for all depositors irrespective of their location.
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In this way, innovation in the financial services industry is the result of strategic
positioning.
Matutes and Padilla (1994) address the effect of ATM compatibility on
banking competition in the deposit market. They show that either full incom-
patibility or partial compatibility occurs. Full compatibility never constitutes
a Perfect Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A coalition of
two compatible banks vetoes full compatibility since the competitive effects
dominate the increase in network effects. Phonebanking however, contains no
network effects, since the cost of exercising a transaction by phone is indepen-
dent of the number of banks offering the phone option. Therefore, we do not
need more than two banks for the analysis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
model. Section 2.3 offers the solution of the game and interprets the results.
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A Model of Spatial Phonebanking Com-
petition on the Circle.
Two banks A and B, each consisting of a single branch, are located on a circle
with unit circumference.s By convention, bank A is located at 0 and bank B has
its location at 1~2.' Banks compete for the deposits of individuals located along
the circle. Competition is modelled as a two-stage game. At stage one, banks
simultaneously decide whether to offer their depositors the phone option or not.
The introduction of this technology is costless for both banks. We assume that
the processing cost for the bank of a transaction executed by phone or at a
branch is the same. This cost is normalized at zero. At stage two, given the
decision by the two banks about stage one, they simultaneously set deposit rates
r;, with i- A, B. Deposits are invested and generate a fixed return R 1 r;.a
sOne could think of a town or a district where a bank opens only one btanch.
'This specific location setting will generate analogous conclusions as in a traditional
Hotelling model where banks A and B are located at 0 and 1, respectively.
`~The chapter takes the existence of the banking firm as a given and focuses only on its
liability side.
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The profit of bank i is rr; -(R - r;)y with y the amount of deposits attracted.
Figure 1: The circle model.
Depositors are uniformly distributed with density one along the circle and com-
petition is such that all depositors open a deposit account. Each depositor
invests on average one normalized unit of money at only one of the two banks.







Table 1: Overview of financial transactions.
The first two kinds arise when the depositor is at his home location. We call
these location-specific. Each depositor has a well-defined location (i.e. his home
location) and from this point he exercises H branch-specific and h non-branch-
specific transactions. Examples of branch-specific transactions are deposits or
withdrawals of cash which clearly need a visit to the branch. A depositor
9We assume that the number of each type of transaction is already the result of an opti-
mization procedure. Their fixed character, however, simplifies calculation.
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located at z visits its branch always via the shortest arc length implying a
transportation cost k-~ tz, with k~ 0 as the constant term and t ~ 0 the per-
unit distance parameter. An economic interpretation for k is the average cost in
waiting time that every depositor incurs before getting served at the bank desk.
Examples of non-branch-specific transactions include provisions, transfers, and
payments which do not need a visit to the branch. If a bank offers its depositors
the phone option, two possibilities exist for the exercise of non-branch-specifac
transactions: depositors either phone their bank at a fixed cost r~ 0, or visit
their bank and face the above transportation cost k plus t per-unit distance. We
will assume throughout the analysis that k) T. This implies that all depositors
prefer the phone option for the non-branch-specific transactions.'o
The other two transactions are non-docation-specific and occur during travel-
ling time. The notion of non-location-specific means that if a depositor travels to
some point on the circle, he can execute financial transactions from that point.
We assume that the depositors arrive at some place on the circle, according
to the uniform distribution." Again, there are branch-specific and non-branch-
speci~ric transactions. Then, the expected cost for M branch-specific transactions
equals M(k f t~4), since the expected distance to the depositor's bank is 1~4.
The expected cost for m non-branch-specific transactions in case no phone op-
tion is available, is obtained in a similar fashion. If the phone option is available,
all depositors prefer it, since k~ r.
If ~ is bank A's market share, the depositor who is indifferent between two
non-phonebanks A and B is located at x~2 such that
rA-(Hfh)(k~t2)-(M~m)(kf 4)-
rB -(H f h)(k -~ t(I 2~)) - (M f m)(k ~ 4). (I)
In eq. ( 1), the non-location-specific transactions cancel out. In other words,
banks are perfect substitutes for these transactions.
'oIn other words, offering the phone option is a quality improvement. In case k C r, best-
response functions become kinked and discontinuous such that the existence of a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies is not ensured.
11Matutes and Padilla (1994) introduce similar transactions; in their model, depositors
need cash unexpectedly when "travelling" around the city.
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The depositor who is indifferent between phonebank A and non-phonebank
B is located at x~2 such that
rA-H(kft2)-hT-M(kf4)-mT-
rB -(H f h)(k f t(1 2 ~)) -(M f m)(k ~ 4). (2)
In eq. (2) m-transactions do not longer cancel out. In addition, the non-
branch-specific transactions imply a lower cost at the phonebank. These differ-
ences in transaction costs have an impact on the marginal depositor.
The depositor who is indifferent between two phonebanks A and B is located
at x~2 such that
rA-H(kft2)-hT-M(k~ 4)-mT-
rB-H(kft(12~))-hT-M(kf4)-mr. (3)
The terms concerning h-, m- and M-transactions disappear. Their fixed
cost character explains this result. The market shares x and 1-~ between two
phonebanks are determined by the deposit rates and the H-transactions.
Some additional notation is introduced before moving to the following sec-
tion. Denote by P; phonebank i and by N; non-phonebank i.
2.3 Solution of the Game.
We solve the game for its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) in pure
strategies by backward induction. Subsection 2.3.1 focuses on the equilibria
for the game in stage two, given the decisions by the two banks taken in the
first stage. The SPNE for the two-stage game are presented in subsection 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Second Stage Competition: The Choice of Inter-
est Rates.
There are three subgames12 to be considered: two non-phonebanks (N,y, NB)
(section 2.3.1.1), one phonebank only (PA, NB) (section 2.3.1.2) and two
12The same results apply for the cases where bank B is the first element in the tuple.
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phonebanks (PA, PB) (section 2.3.1.3). In order to derive a Nash equilibrium
in deposit rates for each subgame, we compute the best response functions for
both banks, taking into account that the behavior of the indifferent depositor
determines their market share. Section 2.3.1.4 interprets the results within and
across subgames.
2.3.1.1 Subgame (NA,Ng).
This subgame is comparable to a well-known model of product differentiation on
the circle with linear transportation costs, since every depositor has to execute
all transactions at the branch of his bank. From (1), bank A's market share is
~- t(H ~ h) (rA - rB f t(H2 h) ). (4)
Substituting (4) into bank A's profit function, we obtain its best response func-
tion :
r,a - 2(Ta - t(HZ h) f R). (5)
In a similar way, one finds the best response function for bank B. In equi-
librium, each bank captures half of the market, charges the same deposit rate
rÁ(NA, NB) - rB(NA, NB) - R- t(H -}- h)~2 and obtains as profit
~'n(NA, Na) - ~é(Na, Ne) - t(H4 h). (6)
Equation (6) contains only location-specific transactions. The m- and M-
transactions disappear because of a Bertrand result : banks are not differenti-
ated with respect to these non-location-specific transactions.
Comparative statics for the (NA, NB) case are shown in Table 2. An increase
in t enhances both banks' monopoly power, generating lower deposit rates and
higher profits. Both types of location-specific transactions reduce the equilib-
rium deposit rate and increase profits. Changes in exogenous variables do not
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affect the equilibrium market share. The M-transactions and the difference
k- r do not influence the equilibrium deposit rate, market share and profits.
t H h M m k-r
r; - - - 0 0 0
x; 0 0 0 0 0 0
~r; f f f 0 0 0
Table 2: Comparative statics for the (NA, NB) case.
2.3.1.2 Subgame (Pp, Ng).
In the second subgame, only one bank offers the phone option. From eq. (2),
bank A's market share is
~- t(2H f h) (rA - rB ~
h(k - r) f m(k - T f 4) f t(H2 h) ). (7)
Substituting eq. (7) into bank A's profit function, its best-response function
equals
rA - 2(rB - t(H2 h) - h(k - r) - m(k - T f 4) f R). (8)
Substituting eq. (7) into bank B's profit function, its best-response function
becomes:
re - 2(ra - t2 f h(k - T) f m(k - T f 4) f R). (9)
From eqs. ( 8) and (9) the equilibrium deposit rates for this subgame are :
rÁ(PA, NB) - R - t(H ~ h) - ~(k - T) -~ t~` - ~(k - T ~ t ) (io)2 3 6 3 4
and
ré(Pa, Na) - R- t(H2 h) f 3(k - T) ~ 3 ~ 3 (k - T ~ 4). (11)
The corresponding equilibrium market shares are :
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~A(PA, Ne) - t(2H ~- h)
(t(3HS 2h) } 3(k - r) f 3(k - r~- 4)) (12)
and
~á(P,a~ Ne) - t(2H f h) ( t(3 6~ h)
- 3( k - r) - 3(k - r f 4))- (13)
It follows that the equilibrium profits are :
~á(Pa, Na) - t(2H f h)
(t(3H~ 2h) ~ 3 (k - T) f 3(k - r f 4 ))~ (14)
and
~é(PA, Na) - t(2H f h) (t(3 6} h)
- 3( k - r) - 3(k - r f 4))z. (15)
In this subgame, banks are clearly differentiated with respect to the m-, h-
and H-transactions. As a consequence, these transactions enter into the profit
functions.
t H h M m k-T
rÁ - - - 0 - -
rB - - - 0 -F f
2,`q - - ~ ~ f ~
~g ~ ~- ~ ~ - -
~Á ~ f ~ L] ~ ~
~B ~ ~ ~ ~ - -
Table 3: Comparative statics for the (PA, NB) case.
Comparative statics for the (PA, NB) case are summarized in Table 3. Higher
transportation costs reduce both banks' deposit rates. However, they affect the
(non-) phonebank's market share in a(positive) negative way. The overall effect
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on profits is positive for both banks. Gocation-specifcc transactions increase the
intermediation rate for both banks. The H-transactions reduce the phonebank's
market share to the advantage of the non-phonebank and decrease the gains
from differentiation. The effect of h-transactions on the deposit rate is negative,
while the effect on market share and profits is ambiguous. The m-transactions
and the difference in fixed wsts k- T reduce (increase) the (non-)phonebank's
deposit rate and increase (reduce) market share. They both unambiguously
enhance (reduce) the profits of the (non-) phonebank.
2.3.1.3 Subgame (P,~,PB).
From eq. (3), bank A's market share is
1 tH
~ - tH
(rq - rg ~ 2). (16)
Substituting eq. (16) into bank A's profit function, we can derive its best
response function:
1 tH
rn - 2 (ra - 2 -~ R). (17)
Bank B's best-response function is similarly derived. In equilibrium, each bank
captures half of the market and offers as deposit rate
TA(pAi Pe) - rB(Pa, PB) - R- t2 .
The equilibrium profits are
(18)
tH
~á(Pn, PB) - ~B(Pa, PB ) - 4. (19)
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Equation ( 19) shows that the h-transactions do not enter the profit function
for the same reason as the m- and M-transactions in eq. ( 6). Banks are not
differentiated with respect to the h-transactions, and price competition cannot
be relaxed. Consequently, a Bertrand result appears.
Comparative statics are summarized in Table 4 and are similar to the (NA, NB)
case except for the h-transactions.
t H h M m k--
r; -- 0 0 0 0
x; 0 0 0 0 0 0
~r; ~ f 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Comparative statics for the (PA, PB) case.
2.3.1.4. Interpretation.
Before moving to the first stage, some comparisons can be made about the de-
posit rates and market shares within and across the different subgames. First,
rÁ(PA, NB) can either be larger or smaller than rÁ(NA, NB). This ambiguity
stems from two reasons. The first is that in the (PA, NB) case more differentia-
tion is introduced vis-à-vis the (NA, NB) case: all depositors strictly prefer the
phone option for their m- and h-transactions being offered at bank A only. This
results in a reduction of A's deposit rate as shown by the third and fifth term
in eq. (10). The same reasoning explains the opposite observation in eq. (11)
for bank B's deposit rate. The other reason is that less differentiation results in
banks competing more strenuously for the same deposítors: neighboring deposi-
tors become less captive, resulting in a reduction of their monopoly power. The
fourth component in eqs. ( 10) and (11) illustrates this effect. Adding up both
effects generates the above ambiguity for bank A. For bank B, however, no am-
biguity results, since rB(PA, NB) ~ rB(NA, NB). The non-phonebank increases
its deposit rate on deposits in order not to be driven out of the market.
Second, rB(PA, NB) 1 rÁ(PA, NB). Bank A is differentiated from B and can
use its monopoly power to charge a lower deposit rate.
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Third, rÁ(Pa, Ne) C rA(Pa, PB). When both banks introduce the phone
option, they are not differentiated with respect to their m- and h-transactions:
a Bertrand result holds for these transactions. If bank B does not offer the
phone option, more differentiatíon results. Depositors prefer bank A in order
to execute their m- and h-transactions. Therefore, they become more captive
vis-à-vis the situation where both banks offer the phone option. This results in
a lower deposit rate. The same reasoning explains why rB(Pa, NB) can either
be larger or smaller than rB(Pa, PB).
Fourth, r;(Na, NB} C r;(Pa, PB), with i- A, B. Both banks are differen-
tiated with respect to their h-transactions when both banks do not offer the
phone option. This is not the case if both banks offer the phone option. The
introduction of the phone option unambiguously steps up competition between
banks, yielding a higher deposit rate.
Fifth, ~Á(Pa, NB) ~ xB(Pa, NB). The phonebank clearly attracts a higher
market share vis-à-vis the subgames (Na, NB) and (Pa, PB). Two effects can be
distinguished in case bank A deviates from the (Na, NB) towards the (Pa,NB)
case.13 One is the demand effect (the direct effect) through a change in market
share given B's equilibrium deposit rate of the (Na, NB) case. This change
equals
~a(Pa,Na)~(NA,NB)-~a(Na,Ne) - t(2H ~ h)( 4 fh(k-r)~ 2(k-Tf4)) ~ 0
(20)
and is positive since depositors strictly prefer to execute their m- and h-transact-
ions by phone. The direct effect on profits is positive, since bank A's deposit
rate decreases. The other is the strategic effect (the indirect effect) and captures
the impact on A's (the phonebank's) profits through the change in B's (the non-
phonebank's) deposit rate. The effect on market share is negative and equals
~á(Pa,Ne)-xa(Pa,Ne)~(Na,NB) - t(2H ~- h)(-
6-6(k-r)- 6(k-Tf4)) c 0.
(21)
laSee Tirole (1988, p. 281) for more details on these two effects.
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The change in deposit rate is positive, resulting in a negative strategic effect
on profits. Adding up eqs. (20) and (21), the total change ín terms of market
share becomes positive: a phonebank competing with a non-phonebank attracts
a higher market share. The total effect on profits, however, is ambiguous.
Sixth, a simple welfare analysis shows that depositors are best off if both
banks offer the phone option. The introduction of the phone option by only one
bank also increases the welfare of the depositors. Both increases in welfare result
from a combination of the competitive effects between banks and the decrease
in transportation costs. The depositors strictly prefer (PA, PB) to (PA, NB) and
(Pn, Na) to (NA~ Ne).
Finally, using the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), banks act
as puppy dogs in their decision to offer the phone option. According to the
above analysis, that decision negatively (positively) influences the opponent's
market share (deposit rate), irrespective of his first-stage decision. Due to the
negative effect on the opponent's profit, offering the phone is a tough strategy.
Since price competition yields strategic complements, the puppy dog strategy
follows. As a result, banks show a tendency towards underinvestment in the
phone technology.
2.3.2 First Stage Competition: Phone Option Decision.
In the first stage of the game, the two banks simultaneously choose whether
to introduce the phone option or not. They do so knowing that in the second
stage they will compete ín deposit rates as described in subsection 3.1.
From eqs. ( 1), (2) and ( 3), M-transactions do not affect the marginal de-
positor. Therefore, M equals zero without loss of generality. In what follows,
we normalize h f H f m- 1. Then, m measures the percentage of non-
location-specific transactions. For the sake of simplicity, assume H - ah, so
that h- ( 1 - m)~(1 ~- ~) and m E[0,1].
The following proposition characterizes all possible SPNE in pure strategies
for the overall game.
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Proposition: Let H- ah ~ 0, h f H-F m- 1,
(4(k - r) -~ t)(a ~- 1)m(t)-1-
3t 2(a -~ 1)(2a ~- 1) -~ a(4(k - T) - 5t) - 3t
and
(4(k - T) ~- t)(a f 1)
m(t)-1- .
-3t 2a(2a f 1) -}- a(4(k - r) f 7t) -}- 3t
a) If m E [0, m(t)], then no bank introduces the phone option (region I).
b) If m E[m(t), irz(t)], then only one bank íntroduces the phone option (region
II).
c) If rn E[m(t),1), then both banks introduce the phone option (region III).
Proof : Straightforward calculations show that ~r; (P;,N~) G ~rt (N;,N~) if and
only if m G rrc(t) and ~r~(P„ P~) G ~r~ (P~, N~) if and only if m G m(t), i ~ j and
for all i, j E{A, B}. Notice that m(t) G ~n.(t).
a) For m G m(t), we have that a;(P„ N~) G~ti (Nt, N~) and ~r~ (P;, P~) G
~r~ (P;, N~) hold, resulting in (NA, NB) as the unique SPNE.
b) For rrt(t) G m G in(t), we have that ~r;(P;, N~ )~~r; (N;, N~ ) and ~r~ (P;, P~ ) G
~r~ (P;, N~) hold. This results in (PA, NB) and ( NA, PB) as the two SPNE.
c) For m(t) G m, we have that ~r~(P;, P~) ~ a~ (P;, N~) and ~r; (P„ N~) ~
~; (N;, N~) hold, resulting in (PA, PB) as the unique SPNE. 0
Figure 2 illustrates the proposition for given values of a, r and k. We depict
t on the horizontal and m on the vertical axis. The functions m(t) and rri(t)
represent the borderlines between regions 1 and II, II and III, respectively.





Figure 2: The phone option decision.
The equilibrium outcome depends on the relative strength of the demand and
strategic effect. Region I describes the parameter constellations for an equilib-
rium with no phonebarzking. Introducing the phone option in that region implies
a strategic effect outweighing the demand effect. Thus, although offering the
phone option yields a higher market share, the percentage of m-transactions
is too low to compensate for the encouraged competition. The higher their
percentage, however, the more a depositor values a phonebank.
Region II satisfies the parameter constellations for specialization: only one
bank offers the phone option. Specialization occurs whenever transportation
costs are sufficiently high and m has intermediate values. Here, offering the
phone option implies a demand effect dominating the strategic effect. Only
in this region, the depositors' value for the phone option affects the marginal
depositor. The phonebank appropriates part of its depositors' value for the
phone option. Therefore, it enjoys a lower deposit rate and a larger market
share compared to the non-phonebank. The latter does not offer the phone
option, as it induces two effects. First, the percentage of m-transactions would
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not affect the marginal depositor's choice of bank anymore. Second, it would
result in a lower degree of horizontal differentiation, enhancing competition.
Adding up, the strategic effect overwhelms the demand effect. It is clear that a
coordination problem arises with respect to who will become the phonebank. A
sequential game where nature decides who moves first, could solve this problem.
Region III contains the parameter constellations where universal phonebank-
ing takes place. Each bank individually decides to offer the phone option: the
demand effect always dominates the strategic effect. Remark that (NA, NB) as
well as (PA, PB) are standard models of product differentiation, the latter hav-
ing lower costs of transportation. Therefore, in region III a Prisoner's dilemma
situation occurs. Although not introducing the phone option would be more
profitable for both banks, each bank individually decides to offer the phone
option.
The borderline ~re(t) is upward-sloping and concave. The slope can be ex-
plained from eqs. (6) and (14), where ó~rÁ(NA, NB)~ót ) ó~Á(PA, NB)~ót for
any (m, t) satisfying m- m,(t). For a given m, the strategic effect increases with
t, whereas the demand effect is decreasing. An increase in the m-transactions
countervails these two effects. That is, along this borderline, a bank needs more
m-transactions when offering the phone as t increases. Concavity results from
á2~Á(PA, NB)~8m2 ) 0. In a similar way, one can explain the upward-sloping
concave borderline m(t) separating regions II and III.
The demand effect becomes more important when the cost difference k-
r increases. In other words, the size of region III (universal phonebanking)
increases. The opposite holds for region I(no phonebanking). The size of
regions I, II and III depends upon the underinvestm,ent effect. The puppy dog
strategy enlarges the set of parameters satisfying regions I and II.
Two special ca.ses remain. First, if m- 1, (PA, NB), (NA, PB) and (PA, PB)
are SPNE. The second-stage equilibrium in both the (PA, PB) and (NA, NB)
case is setting r; - R. In cases (PA, NB) or (NA, PB), the phonebank's optimal
deposit rate drives its non-phone competitor out of the market. (NA, NB) cannot
be an SPNE, since one bank always makes strictly positive profits by offering
the phone option. Then, the non-phonebank cannot strictly increase its profits
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with also offering the phone option. The same reasoning applies to the (PA, Pa)
equilibrium. Each SPNE enables all depositors to make use of the phone option.
However, all gains from the phone technology are captured by depositors when
both banks offer the phone option. Second, if ~- 0, the results for regions
I and II of figure 2 remain intact. Region III, however, shows three SPNE :
(PA, PB), (PA, NB) and (NA, PB). If both banks offer the phone option, they
set deposit rates equal to R and realize zero profits. If only one bank offers the
phone option, its optimal deposit rate is such that the non-phonebank is driven
out of the market.
2.3.3 Collusion, Fees, and Multiproduct Banks.
Assume banks can collude in the second stage by signing some binding agreement.14
Then, universal phonebanking will result. Offering the phone option induces
only a demand effect. Banks fully appropriate the marginal depositor's de-
crease in travelling costs per depositor. Alternatively, any deposit rate fixed by
government, encourages universal phonebanking.
Introducing more complicated contracts in this model will not necessarily
alter our results. Take the case of a fee per (type of) transaction and a deposit
rate. In practice, some banks charge a fee for phonebanking. In our model,
however, a higher deposit rate will fully compensate this fee. The fee per (type
of ) transaction acts as a perfect substitute for the deposit rate, since the number
of transactions is fixed. Deposit rate and fees, however, are no longer perfect
substitutes if the number of transactions is endogenous. Also, spatial discrim-
ination is not an alternative. Depositors can circumvent this by making an
agreement with someone living closer to the bank.
Suppose a phonebank offers its depositors the choice between two products.
In contrast to the first product, the second allows the depositor to use the
phone option. With each product, the bank associates a deposit rate. Nearby
depositors are most willing to buy product one if its associated deposit rate is
sufficiently higher. Note that these two products do not affect the location of the
marginal depositor between banks. Therefore, the multiproduct phonebank can
145ee Fershtman and Gandal (1994).
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not improve on profits. In other words, it is optimal for banks to practice 'pure
bundling'. 's Heterogeneity in the number of depositors' transactions would
allow banks better to discriminate among depositors. Differentiation between
firms, however, seems to be more important for profitability than the possibility
of discrimination (see Champsaur and Rochet (1990)).
2.4 Concluding Remarks.
We investigated the effects of phonebanking upon competition in the market for
deposits. Our model shows that diverse equilibria occur. Two opposite effects
are responsible for this díversity. First, the phone option reduces depositors'
transaction costs. This creates a demand effect. Second, it encourages compe-
tition among banks through these lower transaction costs. This is the strategic
effect. There is no phonebanking if the strategic effect dominates. Specializa-
tion appears for a relatively large demand effect and a moderate strategic effect.
Universal phonebanking emerges if the demand effect overwhelms the strategic
effect. The latter leads to tougher competition compared to no phonebank-
ing. The competitive effects result in a tendency to underinvest in the phone
technology. Depositors are best ofi with universal phonebanking.
We conclude with three possible extensions. First, if the phone option im-
plies a reduction in processing costs, its attractiveness for banks increases. The
competítive effects, however, remain. Second, one could make the number of
financial transactions endogenous, following the Baumol-Tobin tradition (see
Barro and Santomero (1972), Santomero (1979)). One expects the average out-
standing amount of deposits to be higher in case a of a phonebank. Therefore,
the attractiveness of offering the phone option increases. Third, our results also
remain valid in a slightly different model with some depositor heterogeneity
in terms of the number of transactions. Price competition is relaxed in the
(PA, NB) case. However, price competition is enhanced in the (PA, PB) case.
1sThis stems with the statement that "a bank offers an indivisible array of services" (see
Tirole (1988), p. 160).
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a Mail Order Business
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the equilibrium structure of an industry in which firms
sell a homogeneous good at mill prices by two alternative methods. The first
method consists of opening a retail store, which consumers can visit by paying
a linear transportation cost. In the spatial price terminology, this method is
called 'uniform Free-On-Board (FOB) pricing." The other method involves
setting up a`mail order business,' where consumers are served by paying a
fixed cost, irrespective their initial location. The mail order business serves its
consumers by some exogenous technology, e.g. a postal service. Both selling
policíes have in common that none of the firms bears transportation costs. They
differ, however, in their impact on consumers' decisions. When a consumer
buys at a retail store, his total expenditure equals the price at retail plus his
transportation cost to the retail store. In contrast, all consumers buying at the
mail order business have the same total expenditure. The store's selling policy
implies uniformity of the price only at the store. The mail order business's
lIn discussing this spatial price policy, Phlips (1983) remarks: "In any event, the net
producer price (after deduction of freight) is the same whatever the destination, since at any




selling policy implies uniformity of the price - not only at the mail order
business, but also at the place of delivery; that is, the consumer's home location.
The fixed transportation cost implies that a price change affects every consumer
equally. Location, therefore, becomes completely irrelevant when selling occurs
by a mail order business. Markets in which consumers are served by stores
and mail order businesses include the following: books, clothing, computers2,
flowerbulbs, photographic developing, records, banking and insurance products,
and so on. This chapter aims at investigating the conditions and properties of
an industry with the above characteristics.
The analysis adds a mail order business to the standard circle model à
la Salop (1979). We characterize the protected monopoly,3 the oligopoly and
free-entry equilibrium, and the social optimum. It is never optimal for the
monopolist to offer at the same time both selling policies, i.e. stores and a mail
order business. With free-entry, only one store or mail order business is allowed
per firm. If the set-up cost is large relative to the marginal transportation
cost, no mail order business appears. However, at most one mail order business
emerges in equilibrium. The mail order business competes in a non-localized
fashion with all stores. The retail stores, however, compete in a localized way
with the mail order business. The presence of a mail order business implies
more competition, compared to the original Salop-model. As a result, a smaller
number of firms is active in equilibrium. Finally, in the social optimum, it is
never optimal to offer both selling policies at the same time.
The importance of mail order businesses varies between countries. In terms
of per capita expenditures for 1991, it ranges from ~23 in Italy, to ~273 in the
United States. As a percentage of the total turnover in the non-food retail trade
in 1991, the mail order industry represented 5.1~o in France, 4.7~o in Sweden,
and in the total retail trade, 4.7oI'o in the Federal R.epublic of Germany.4 These
ZIn 1991, 22010 of all microcomputers in the US were sold through the mail ( see McWilliama
(1991)). In 1992, this figure increased to 30010 ( see Bhargava (1992))
3I.e., a monopolist `who does not face the threat of entry' ( Bonanno ( 1987), p.39).
4Source : NRC Handelsólad, June 30, 1993 and Enropean Mail Order ~ade Association,
Key Figures 1991.
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figures, however, take no account of the importance of the mail order business
in a particular industry. They include industries where no mail order business
exists. Excluding these industries will increase the mail order industry's share.
A mail order business can serve the entire market without affecting the
consumer's cost of being served. This differs from uniform zone pricing in at
least two ways. First, uniform zone pricing implies that every consumer within
a well-defined region is charged the same price. Actual transportation costs,
however, are borne by the firm. By choosing such a pricing policy, the firm faces
a minimization problem for its total transportation costs. Second, the larger
the market that is being served, the larger the average transportation cost is.
Therefore, and in contrast with the mail order business, location matters under
uniform zone pricing.
The economics literature on spatial structure in the retail trade where fixed
versus linear transportation costs appear in a strategic context is rather scarce.s
Heal (1980) studies a circle model in which consumers can buy either from the
producer at the center or from a store on the circumference. Also the store,
however, has to buy its products from the producer at the center. Due to
increasing returns to scale in transportation costs, the outer store can develop
a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the consumers. Lewis (1945) takes account
of forms of retailing in which consumers do not visit the stores but order by
telephone or by mail. He remarks that this kind of retailing is "convenient if the
customer knows what he wants ..."(p.216). Henriet and Rochet (1991) discuss
a circle model in which consumers can buy insurance either directly from the
company (located at the center of the circle) or from one of its intermediaries
(located on the circle). Buying from the direct writer implies a fixed cost for the
consumer, regardless of his location. The alternative is to buy from the nearest
SThere is, however, a considerable body of literature on endogenous (spatial) pricing poli-
cies. Spiegel (1982) demonstrates that sellers prefer the `meet the competition' policy to
uniform delivered pricing and mill pricing. Furlong and Slotsve (1983) show that a monop-
olist can increase profits when the choice is available between mill and uniform delivered
pricing. In a different context, Bester (1993) analyzes whether posted prices or negotiated
pricing will emerge in a market with quality uncertainty.
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intermediary. They investigate the influence of different vertical restraints on
the equilibrium outcome.
One recent article in the economics literature on mail order businesses versus
retail stores is Michael (1994). He uses the theory of transaction costs to explain
marketing channels. His analysis focusses on differences in costs of physical
distribution and of informing the consumers in mail order businesses and retail
stores. Changes over time in these costs significantly affect the sales of mail
order businesses. The empirical results also support the assertion that a higher
density of population makes retailing relatively more advantageous.
The subject of the chapter clearly differs from Thisse and Vives (1988),
in which firms make strategic choices in terms of spatial práce policy. Thisse
and Vives consider two price policies: uniform FOB pricing and discriminatory
pricing. They find "a robust tendency for a firm to choose the discriminatory
policy" (p. 134). In footnote 8, they remark: "let us emphasize the fact that
what we call here uniform pricing is different from uniform delivered pricing as
defined in postage stamp systems." This chapter takes these two variants of
uniform pricing as the available strategic choices for selling products.
In contrast with the economics literature, the marketing and retailing lit-
erature focusses on the mail order industry (see e.g. Darian (1987)). The
central theme is on the relationship between demographic characteristics at the
household level and (mail order) shopping behavior. This chapter studies the
impact of selling by a mail order business on competition with retail stores. In
the same line as the cited article by Thisse and Vives, the analysis stresses that
"current business practices reflect a strategác positioning of firms in the market"
(P. 122).s
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. Section
3.3 analyzes the optimal structure for a monopolist. In order to focus on strate-
6As an example, Dell Computer Corp. aells exclusively through the mail. In conttast,
Compaq Computer Corp. concentrates on selling through stores.
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gic interactions between firms, Section 3.4 studies the oligopoly case. Section
3.5 considers the equilibrium market structure in a free-entry context. Section
3.6 addresses a welfare analysis. Finally, Section 3.7 contains some concluding
remarks.
3.2 The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product. Marginal cost of production is
constant and without loss of generality normalized at zero. Each firm, indexed
by i- 1, ..., N, can choose from a set of two strategies to market the product.
The first is the traditional way of opening a single store. At this store, consumers
are charged a uniform mill price p; 1 0. Each consumer located at distance z
from the store, bears the linear transportation cost tz ) 0. We use the Salop
(1979) circle model, where firms are located equidistant from each other. The
second strategy is to open a mail order business, where consumers can order the
product (by mail) at a mill price q; 1 0 plus a non-negative fixed cost cp (e.g.
the price of the stamp) for sending the product to the consumer's location. This
fixed cost cp is assumed to be independent of one's location and not susceptible
to (strategic) manipulation by any of the players.' One possible interpretation
is that the mail order business is located at the center of the circle. The radius
of the circle then represents the fixed cost c~.
There is a unit mass of consumers whose initial locations are uniformly
distributed on a circle with density one. The consumers buy from that firm
that offers the lowest full price, i.e. mill price plus fixed or linear transportation
cost. Each consumer has the same reservation price r and buys at most one
unit of the good.
7The model assumes that price discrimination based on the consumer's address is illegal.
This seems reasonable if the analysis concentrates on competition within one country.
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3.3 Monopoly
Consider a protected monopolist who can make use of both selling policies. The
monopolist decides on the number of stores on the circle, whether to set up a
mail order business and, for each of these selling policies, what prices to charge.
There is an identical positive set-up cost F for every mail order business and
each store on the circle. Assume that r 1 t so that, with only one store on the
circle, it is in the monopolist's interest to serve the whole market. In addition,
assume that r~ cp, so that a mail order business ca,n operate for some positive
set-up cost.
Lemma 1: If the monopolist can only open stores on the circle, his profit equals
max(0, r- 2tF), and 0.5t~F is the optimal number of stores.
Proof: Store i's marginal consumer, located at ~, is defined by the equation
p; ~ t~ - r. This implies that the monopolist's profit function is 2n~~(r - t~) -
n~F, with n~ the number of stores on the circle. Maximize this with respect to
x, and the function is increasing as long as r 1 2t~. From the assumptions of
symmetry and r~ t, 0.5 C~ at r- 2tx. Therefore, with n~ 1 1 stores, the
monopolist finds it optimal to serve the whole market, such that ~ - 0.5~n~,
and the profit function becomes r- 0.5t~n~ - n~F. Maximizing with respect
to n~ yields an optimal number of n~ - 0.5t~F. After substitution, the profit
equals r- 2tF. If this profit is larger than zero, the monopolist opens a
number of 0.5t~F stores on the circle. Otherwise, the monopolist stays out
of the market. O
Lemma 2: Assume that the monopolist cannot open stores on the circle. If
r- cp ~ F, the monopolist opens one (and only one) mail order business.
Otherwise, he opens no mail order business at all.
Proof: If the monopolist opens nm ~ 1 mail order businesses, his profit equals
(r-cp)-nmF. Therefore, opening more than one store would only reduce profits.
If r-cp -F ~ 0, the monopolist opens only one mail order business. If F is such
that profits are negative, the monopolist opens no mail order business at all. ~
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Proposition 1 contains the main result of this section. In contrast with Lemmas
1 and 2, we allow the monopolist to sell by stores and mail order businesses.
The proposition assumes that both ways of selling are profitable.
Proposition 1: (a) The monopolist opens a single mail order store if y~ f F G
2tF; (b) he opens 0.5t~F stores on the circle if cp ~ F 1 2tF; (c) he never
operates both types of business.
Proof: If the monopolist can offer both types of selling policies, he chooses
p;, qt, n~, n„~ and .z' so as to maximize
~(pt, 4t, n~, n,,,, x) - 2n~xp; f min(1, n„~)(I - 2n~~)q; -(n~ f n„~)F
subject to 0 C x C 0.5~n~ and n~, n~ ) 0. The variable p; (q;) denotes the
price at a store on the circle (at a mail order business). The number of stores,
n~ and n~, are interpreted similarly. From the profit function, it is clear that
at most one mail order business will be opened, if any. The consumer who
is indifferent between buying at a store on the circle and at the mail order
business is characterized by q; ~ cp - p; f t~ - r. Substitute this into the
profit function, and differentiation with respect to ~ shows that the function
is monotonically non-decreasing as long as cp 1 2t~. Since 0 C x G 0.5~n~,
~- min(0.5~n~, 0.5cp~t). If cp~t G l~n~, the profit function becomes
~(n" n~`) - 2n`2t(r
- t2t) f min(1,nm)(1 - 2n~2t)(r -
`p) - (n~ ~- n,,,)F.
If, in equilibrium, the monopolist uses both selling policies, (1 - 2n~cp~2t)(r -
c~) ~ nmF. After some rearranging, the function becomes
a
~r(n~, nm) - r- cp - nmF -~ n~(2t - F).
~r(-, n,,,) is non-decreasing in n~ as long as cp 1 2tF. In this case, n~ can
be increased up to the point where cp~t - l~n~. Every mail order business,
therefore, cannot attract a positive market share. 5ince profits are decreasing
in n,,,, no mail order business is opened. In the other case, in which cp G 2tF,
~r(.,n,,,) is strictly decreasing in n~ and no stores on the circle are opened. The
optimal number of one mail order business results if profits are nonnegative.
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If l~n~ C y~~t, the profit function becomes ( after rearranging)
~(n~, n„~) - r - t - (n~ -}- n„~)F.2n~
Since ó~r(n~,nm)~8n„L G 0, the optimal number of mail order stores equals
zero. Differentiate with respect to n~, and the optimal number n~ of stores on
the circle equals 0.5t~F. If the resulting profit r- 2tF is nonnegative, the
monopolist opens a number of 0.5t~F stores on the circle (see Lemma 1).
The monopolist now makes the optimal choice by comparing both profits. If
r- cp - F 1 r- 2tF, if and only if y~ ~- F~ 2tF, the monopolist prefers to
open one and only one mail order business (see Lemma 2). Otherwise, he only
opens the optimal number of stores on the circle. ~
In words, the monopolist either opens retail stores or one mail order business.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose opening a single mail order business is
profitable. In addition, suppose the opening of one or more retail stores together
with the mail order business yields extra profits, despite the additional fixed set-
up costs. Then, ignoring integer problems, the monopolist's optimal decision is
to serve the whole market by retail stores. In that case, the mail order business
serves no consumers. Therefore, the monopolist opens no mail order business.
If, on the contrary, opening the extra retail store does not yield extra profits,
he opens a single mail order business.
3.4 Oligopoly
Let there be a fixed number of firms in the market, indexed by i- 2, ..., N.
The model presented in Section 2 is analyzed as a two-stage game. In the first
stage, firms decide on whether to become traditional stores (and consequently
are appointed a position on the circle) or mail order businesses (and conse-
quently have their location at the center of the circle). In the second stage,
having observed each other's decision in the first stage and the corresponding
location, they compete in prices. We solve the game for its Subgame Perfect
Nash equilibria in pure strategies by the method of backward induction.
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Before moving to the two relevant cases, consider the case in which more
than one firm operates as a mail order business. A standard Bertrand result
appears for these firms, since they are not differentiated at all with respect to
each other. Price competition results in charging a price equal to marginal cost.
Since set-up costs are strictly positive, in pure strategies at most one firm will
open a mail order business. This results in two possible alternatives: (i) no firm
operates a mail order business, and (ii) exactly one firm sells through the mail.
Alternative (i) coincides with Salop's circle model of product differentiation.
All N firms decide to open a store on the circle. The distance between every pair
of firms equals 1~N. 5uppose firm i chooses a price p;, and that p is the price
charged by the other firms. Then, a consumer located at distance ~ from firm




The difference (1~N - x) is the distance between the indifferent consumer's
location x and the neighboring firm. Solving (1) for x, one obtains firm i's
demand at both sides. Define profits as total demand times price, and firm i's
profit equals
~;(P~,P) - 2xp~ - p - ptt t,Np~. (2)
Optimizing this with respect to p;, p; - 0.5(p ~ t~N) is firm i's optimal price,
given p. By symmetry, set p; - p. This yields the symmetric solution, so that
p; - p` - t~N.s Firm i's market share then becomes i~N. It follows that every
firm's gross profit, expressed as a function of the number of firms N, equals
as(N) - NZ. (3)
sThis analysis also assumes that the market equilibrium lies in the competitive region of
firm i's demand curve. That is, the reservation price r~ 3t~2 (see Salop (1979) for the
exposition).
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Expression (3) will be referred to as the S-equilibrium profit.
In alternative (ii), only one firm decides to become a mail order business;
the other (N-1) firms are equally spaced around the circle. Each of the (N-1)
firms on the circle is at distance 1~(N - 1) from its two neighbors on the circle.
Each firm i on the circle now faces three competitors: the two nearest ones
on the circle and the mail order business. In between every two neighboring
firms on the circle, two indifferent consumers can be defined. One is indifferent
between firm i and its neighboring firm on the circle. Given a price p charged
by this competitor on the circle, this indifferent consumer is located at y, where
p; f ty - P~ t( (N I I) - y) (4)
as long as y C 1~(N - 1). The other is indifferent between firm i and the
mail order business. Given a price q charged by the mail order business, this
indifferent consumer is located at z such that
-~ tz - q -}- y~. (5)
Figure 1 clearly illustrates that if y C z, the mail order business gains no positive
market share, and consequently, zero profits. If y 1 z, the mail order business
can serve a positive share of the market ( see Figure 2).
Firm i's total demand D; is defined as
2y if OCP;C2(4f~)-(P}t~(N-1))
D;(p;~P,4)- 2z if 2(4f~P)-(Pft~(N-1))Gp;Cqf~p
0 if qfcpC p;.
(6)
Then, profits for firm i on the circle are
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4~4~
0 y z 1~(N - 1)
Figure 1: The mail order business has no market share.
qf4~




0 z y 1~(N - 1)
Figure 2: The mail order business has a positive market share.
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~i(i~i~~i4) - Di(Ë~ii~~4)~i. (7)
Since the mail order business's location is in the center of the circle, it faces
(N - 1) neighbors. For a given price p; charged by every firm i on the circle,
the mail order business first competes for the consumers in the middle between
every two firms on the circle, i.e. at distance 1~(2(N -1)). The consumer, who
is indifFerent between buying at firm i or at the mail order business charging a
price q, is located at z such that
Pi -f- tz - 9 ~- 4~. (8)
Equation (8) applies for each side of all (N - 1) firms on the circle. Therefore,
the mail order business's total demand DM is defined as
0 if q~p;ft~2(N-1)-cp
tif 1~i - ~P C 4 C 7~i f z (~v-1~ -~PDM(i~iiq) - (2 N~1 (~i - ~ - q ~ 2~]y-1~)
(9)
The profit for the mail order business equals
~M(Pieq) - DM(Pi~q)q. (10)
Expression (10) is continuous and quasi-concave in q. Optimizing expression
(7) with respect to pi, and expression (10) with respect to q, the first-order
conditions are
~i - 2 ~
4~~P
q- pi - ~P -f- t~2(N - 1) (12)
2
if all firms on the circle and the mail order business have a positive market
share. Using the assumption of symmetry (p; - pi - p) for the firms on the
circle and using q- q for the mail order business, define the Nash-equilibrium
(p', q') of the pricing-game by a mill price of
1 if qCp;-cp.
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2c~ ~- t~(N - 1)
6
at every store on the circle, and a mill price of
(13)
q. - tI (N - 1) - y~ (14
3 )
at the mail order business. If t~(4(N-1)) ) y~, the price the mail order business
charges is higher than the firms on the circle charge. For higher values of cp,
lower prices result. The price the mail order business and the firms on the circle
charge are always lower compared to the situation in which firms can operate
only on the circle.
Substitute expressions (13) and (14) into (7) and (10) to see that the
profits expressed as a function of the number of firms N are
~~(N) - 18t((N t 1) ~ 2~)2
for every firm on the circle, and
~M(N) - 2( 9t 1) ((N t 1) -~P)2
(15)
(16)
for the mail order business. The expressions (15) and (16) will be referred to as
the M-equilibrium profits.
Before starting with the main proposition of this section, we define the
function h(.) by
h(N) - t( N 1 I- 3 ). (17)
N 2(N - 1)
The function h(.) defines the relationship between cp and N in the S- and the
M-equilibrium. Expression ( 17) is non-negative for all N~ 3; furthermore,
h(3) - 0, h(oo) - 0 and h(2) C 0.
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Proposition 2:(a) If c~ C h(N), then exactly one firm operates a mail order
business and the remaining firms locate on the circle. (b) Otherwise, the unique
equilibrium in pure strategies is that all firms locate on the circle.
Proof : Consider firm i's profit if all other firms are located on the circle. If
firm i decides to locate on the circle, its profit equals t~N2, as can be seen from
expression ( 3). If, however, firm i decides to become a mail order business,
its profit is 2((N - 1)~9t)(t~(N - 1) - cp)z by (16). Therefore, firm i finds it
optimal to start up a mail order business if t~Nz C 2((N-1)~9t)(t~(N-1)-cp)2.
This condition is equivalent to cp G h(N). Given firm i's decision to become a
mail order business, the remaining firms on the circle have a profit of ~rC(N) -
(1~18t)(t~(N-1) f 2cp)2 by (15). It is not profitable for any of the firms on the
circle to switch to the center and become mail order businesses since ~C(N) ) 0.
This establishes part (a). If, however, t~N2 ~ 2((N - 1)~9t)(t~(N - 1) - cp)2,
the opposite inequality holds, i.e. c~ 1 h(N). Firm í locates on the circle and
no other firm switches to the center. This establishes part (b). ~
Proposition 2 implies that if some firm sets up a mail order business, the cost
of sending the good through the mail should be small enough. In that case, the
parametric constellations result in an M-equilibrium. Since y~ is non-negative,
and in an M-equilibrium not larger than h(N), we have that h(N) 1 0. From
the properties of this function, the lower bound on the number of firms in an
M-equilibrium is N~ 3. The intuition is that a firm has an incentive to open
a mail order business only if its profit as a firm on the circle is relatively small.
In an M-equilibrium, the mail order business foregoes some market power by a
decrease in the equilibrium prices. Therefore, a single firm on the circle has no
incentive to become a mail order business if the gain in market share is not large
enough. The mail order business has a larger market share in comparison with
the firms' market shares in the S-equilibrium. Indeed, cp G h(N) implies that
(2(N - 1)~3t)(t~(N - 1) - cp) 1 1~N. As cp increases from 0 to h(N), the mail
order business's market share decreases from 2~3 to 2(N - 1)~N. The total
market share for the firms on the circle increases from 1~3 to 1- 2(N - 1)~N.
The mail order business's market share, therefore, always exceeds that of the
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firms on the circle. For low values of N, the equilibrium mill price at a store
is lower than at the mail order business. For high values of N, the opposite
relationship holds.
In the S-equilibrium, each firm competes with its two neighbors in only a
direct way. The cross-price elasticities are positive for neighboring firms, but
zero for all other firms. Using the terminology of Anderson and de Palma (1990),
there is localized competition. In the M-equilibrium, the firm in the center
competes directly with every firm on the circle. Clearly, this generates some
form of nonlocalized competition, as the cross-price elasticity (óD;~óq)(q~D;)
is positive and identical for all i. The mail order business shoulders itself in
between every firm on the circle. The firms on the circle have only one direct
competitor, i.e. the mail order business. A small change in their own price
affects only the mail order business's market share. The cross-price elasticity
(óD,y~Bp;)(p;~D,y) is positive and identical for all i. The cross-price elasticity
(áD;~áp~)(p~~D;) equals zero for all j~ i. They are engaged in some form of
localized competition. Figure 3 shows an example with N- 7. The bold lines
represent the mail order business's market share.
1
4
Figure 3: Market shares in an M-equilibrium with N- 7.
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The following proposition compares firms' profits in Salop's (1979) model with
firms' profits on the circle if a mail order business is active.
Proposition 3: Firms on the circle earn 6igher profits if no mail order business
operates: ~rs(N) ~ ~~(N).
Proof: Expression ( 3) is strictly larger than expression (15) if and only if
yo G t(3~~N - 1~2(N - 1)). Compare the right-hand side of this inequality
with h(N) to see that t(3~fN - 1~2(N - 1)) ) h(N) if and only if ~ 1
N~(N - 1) - 2~(N - 1). For all N ) 2, the right-hand side of the latter
inequality is an increasing function. By applying 1'Hópital's rule, it reaches its
maximum of 1 for N approaching infinity. Since cp G h(N) in the M-equilibrium,
the result follows. o
Proposition 3 holds because for fixed N prices in the M-equilibrium are lower
than they are in the S-equilibrium. As already noted before, the mail order
business has a larger market share vis-à-vis the firms' market shares in the S-
equilibrium. Therefore, lower prices and market shares for firms on the circle
result in lower profits.
3.5 Free-Entry Equilibrium
This section studies entry into the industry. In order to have a finite number
of firms, we introduce a non-negative fixed set-up cost of production, say F.
The oligopoly two-stage game of the previous section is now enlarged by an
additional stage. The three-stage game proceeds as follows. In the first stage,
each firm decides whether or not it will enter the market. Having observed the
number of firms entering the market, the entrants play the two-stage game of
the previous section. Those who do not enter receive zero profits.
The previous section established that the S- and M-equilibrium are possible
candidates satisfying the subgame perfectness condition. Our Subgame Perfect
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equilibrium of free-entry requires that entering firms earn non-negative profits,
and all other firms anticipate non-positive profits when entering. This motivates
the following two definitions.
Definition 1: NS is the number of firms in a free-entry S-equilibrium if
(i) ~s(Ns) - F; and (ii) ~s(Ns) ~ ~M(Ns)-
Condition ( i) ensures that all firms make zero profits. It implies that NS -
t~F, by ( 3). Condition ( ii) guarantees that with the equilibrium number of
firms in the market, no firm wants to switch to a mail order business. The
condition is equivalent to cp 1 h(NS) ( i.e., the condition in Proposition 2). In
the free-entry ~equilibrium, therefore, y~ ? h( t~F).
Definition 2: N;yr is the number of firms in a free-entry M-equilibrium if
(i) ~r~(NM) - F; and (ii) ~rtit(NiH) ? ~s(Ni~t).
The first condition ensures that all firms on the circle make zero profits. Propo-
sition 3 established that ~r~(N) G~r,y(N). It follows that only the firms on the
circle must satisfy the zero-profit conditions for free-entry. The second condition
guarantees that with the equilibrium number of firms in the market, exactly one
firm wants to switch to the mail order business. Define the following function:
9(N) - 2( 18tF - N t 1). (18)
The function g(.) is increasing and, by ( 18), the equality g(N;y) - y~ represents
the zero-profit condition for the firms on the circle. Condition ( ii) in Definition
2 is equivalent to cp G h(N;y). Therefore, N;y satisfies the requirements (i) and
(ii) of Definition 2 if and only if g(NM) - y~ C h(N;yr). 9 The next proposition
compares the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium of Salop's (1979)
model with the number of firms if a mail order business is active.
9Assume that F C t~18, such that with N;y - 2, a firm on the circle is not prevented
from entering the market.
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Proposition 4: Let as(Ns) -~r~(N1y) - F. Then Ns ) N;y. That is, the
free-entry equílibrium number of firms is larger when there is no mail order
business.
Proof: Suppose NS C N;y. Since expression (15) is decreasing in N,
~rC(N1N) G~~(NS). Proposition 3 implies that in case there is a mail order
business, the profits of the firms on the circle are smaller compared to the num-
ber under the free-entry S-equilibrium. Therefore, ~r~(NS) C~rs(NS). The
free-entry S-equilibrium requires that as(NS) - F. But then ~~(N;y~) G F,
and N;y cannot be the number of firms under a free-entry equilibrium. A con-
tradiction. o
Proposition 4 states that the number of firms in the free-entry S-equilibrium is
larger than it would be in the free-entry M-equilibrium. Therefore, the market
with a mail order business is more competitive. This accords with the result
that nonlocalized competition yields fewer firms in a free-entry equilibrium than
it would in localized competition (see Deneckere and Rothschild, 1992). The
conditions for an S- and M-equilibrium are now analyzed.
Lemma 3: (i) h(3) - 0 and h(N) ) 0 for all N~ 3; (ii) g(3) ? 0 if and only if
t~F C 72; (iii) g'(N) 1 h'(N) for a11 N~ 3; (iv) g(N) ) h(N) for all N large
enough.
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to the Appendix. From Lemma 3, the
following results can be obtained.
Proposition 5: (i) N;y is increasing in cp, and decreasing in F; (ii) If a free-entry
M-equilibrium exists, then N1N ~ 3.
Proof: (i) Inspection of expression (18) yields the comparative static results;
(ii) From Lemma 3, g'(N) 1 0. Lemma 3 establishes that no M-equilibrium
exists if g(3) 1 0. Since cp 1 0, N~y ~ 3 if an M-equilibrium exists. O
An increase in cp implies more friction in the market and prevents the mail order
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business from decreasing the prices drastically. Therefore, more firms can enter
the market.
Proposition 6: (i) Let F G t~72; then there exists a ip ) 0, such that an
M-equilibrium with free-entry exists if and only if 0 G y~ C y~. (ii) If F) t~72,
free-entry does not result in an M-equilibrium.
Proof: (i) By Lemma 3, there exists an N such that h(N) - g(N) - y~. Since
g(3) C 0 and g'(N) ~ h'(N) for all N ~ 3 with g'(N) 1 0, for cp G~ there is a
unique N such that g(N) - cp G h(N); (ii) Since h(3) - 0 and g'(N) ~ h'(N) for
all N 1 3, the condition for a free-entry M-equilibrium 0 G g(N) - y~ C h(N)
(as stated in Definition 2) can never be satisfied. ~
If the fixed set-up cost is too large compared to the marginal cost of transporta-
tion, the zero-profit condition for firms on the circle cannot be satisfied.
Proposition 7: Let N;y and NS satisfy the zero-profit conditions of the free-
entry equilibrium. (a) Let h(N;y) G h(NS). Then, (i) the S-equilibrium with
free-entry is unique if cp ~ h(NS); (ii) the M-equilibrium with free-entry is
unique if cp G h(N~y); (iii) no pure strategy equilibrium exists if h(NM) G
~p G h(NS). (b) Let h(NS) G h(NÍy). Then, (i) the M-equilibrium is unique if
cp G h(NS); (ii) the S-equilibrium is unique if cp ) h(N;yr); (iii) the free-entry
S-equilibrium and the free-entry M-equilibrium coexist if h(NS) G cp G h(NM).
Proof: (a) (i) from Definition 1, a free-entry S-equilibrium exists, since c~ ~
h(NS) holds, while condition ( ii) of Definition 2 is violated; (ii) Similarly, no
free-entry S-equilibrium exists, since condition ( ii) of Definition 1 is violated,
while Definition 2 holds; (iii) In the same fashion, both conditions for the free-
entry S- and M-equilibrium are violated if h(NM) G y~ G h(NS). Part (b) can
be proven in a similar fashion. ~
Figure ( 4a) plots part (a) of Proposition 7. As a numerical example, take
t- 100 and F - 1. It follows that NS - 10, and so h(NS) ~ 4.04. If ~p - h(NS),
N;y ~ 3.91 and h(N;y) ~ 2.56, the free-entry S-equilibrium is thus unique, since
h(N;y) G h(NS) - cp. For every cp ) 4.04 ~ h(NS), we are in the free-entry
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S-equilibrium. If y~ - 1, the only equilibrium is the free-entry M-equilibrium,
since N;y ~ 3.47, and thus ~p C h(N~y) ~ 1.59 G h(NS). If, however, cp - 2,
h(N;y) ~ 1.9, and no equilibrium exists, since h(Niy) G cp G h(NS).
Figure ( 4b) plots part ( b) of Proposition 7. As a numerical example take t- 200
and F- 1. It follows that NS ~ 14.14 and h(NS) ~ 3.48. If cp - 1, then
NM ~ 4.45, and so h(NS) G h(N;y) ~ 6.64 and the free-entry M-equilibrium is
unique. If cp is large enough, the free-entry Sequilibrium is unique; e.g. cp - 10,
N1N - 6 and so h(NS) G h(N~y) ~ 8.37 G cp. For intermediate values of y~, the
free-entry M- and S-equilibrium may co-exist; for instance if y~ - 4, it follows
that NM ~ 4.85, and so h(NS) G y~ G h(N1y) ~ 7.36.
Figure (4a): The S- and M-equilibrium with t- 100 and F- 1.
Figure (4b): The S- and M-equilibrium with t- 200 and F- 1.
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3.6 Welfare Analysis
From the social planner's point of view, the socially optimal selling policy min-
imizes the sum of total transportation costs and set-up costs of production. If
the social planner can only open stores on the circle, as in Salop (1979), he
opens t~4F stores. Straightforward calculations show that total costs equal
tF. If the social planner can only open n,,, mail order businesses, it is optimal
to open only one. This generates a social cost of c~ ~ F.lo
Proposition 8: The socia] planner opens t~4F stores on the circle if cp -~ F~
tF. Otherwise, he opens one mail order business.
Proof: If the social planner can offer both selling policies, he has to minimize
z
W(n~, n„~, ~) - (2n - ~)2n~c~ -} 2n~t2 -~ (n~ ~- n„~)F (19)
~
subject to 0 C x C 0.5~n~; n~,nm ~ 0. The variable x is the distance of the
indifferent consumer between two neighboring stores on the circle.
Optimizing this expression with respect to x, its optimal value x' satisfies x` -
min(cp~t, 0.5~n~). Substituting this back into expression (19) , the optimization
problem reduces to
W(n~,n,,,) - (1 - (min(~, 1)))2n~4~ f2n~ t 2n~
~ i
2n~(min(~, 1
))tcrun( e~ zn~) ~. (n~ ~- nm)F. (20)t 2n~ 2
If cp~t C 0.5~n~, expression ( 20) simplifies to
z
W(n~, nm) - 4~ - n~( t- F) ~- nmF.
The term ( y~z~t - F) is the marginal contribution of a store to the total cost
minimization. If y~z~t - F C 0, if and only if cp C tF, n~ should be as small
as possible, i.e. 0. This results in a total welfare cost of y~ -F F if n,,, - 1.
loThe cost of transportation by mail equals ~y per unit of delivery. Since the technology
operates with or without a mail order business, its cost is only marginal.
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If, however, cpz~t - F~ 0, n~ should be as large as possible. Having a maximum
at t~2y~, the expression becomes
W(n~,nm) - 2 f nmF f 2. (21)
~
Since ~o - 0.5t~n~, the constraint is binding. Substituting this into expression
(21), the social planner faces the following minimization problem:
W(n~, nm) - 4nc ~- (n~ f n„~)F (22)
Expression (22) coincides with the minimization problem the social planner
faces if cp~t ~ 0.5n~ and yields an optimal outcome of (n~, n;,~) -( t~4F, 0).
This outcome results in a total welfare cost equal to tF. The social planner,
therefore, prefers to open the optimal number of stores n~ if cp ~ F~ tF.
Otherwise, he opens one mail order business. O
Proposition 8 tells us that, similar to the monopolist, the social planner will
operate only one type of business. Indeed, suppose cp f F G tF and the social
planner opens a store in addition to the mail order business. The consumer
located at ~- y~~t from the store is indifferent between the mail order business
and the store. The total transportation costs are therefore reduced by y~2~t. If
the additional fixed set-up cost F~ cp2~t, it is not worthwhile to open the store.
Since c~ f F G tF, it is not optimal to open this additional store. Similarly,
if F G ~p2~t, it follows that cp -} F 1 tF. In other words, it is not optimal
to open a mail order business in addition to the stores on the circle. Also, the
surplus per consumer is independent of the number of mail order businesses.
Therefore, the social planner opens only one. Of course, a higher t and lower
cp make the mail order business constellation more likely. Any increase in F
favors the mail order business constellation if n~ ~ 1.
Propositions 1 and 8 make it possible to compare the monopolist and the social
planner. Figure 5 graphically illustrates this comparison in (cp, F)-space. If
cp G tF - F, the social planner and monopolist open only one mail order
business (region I). If cp ) 2tF - F, both open the optimal number of stores
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(region III). For any ~tF- - F C cp G 2tF - F, the social planner opens
the optimal number of stores on the circle, whereas the monopolist opens only
one mail order business ( region II). The intuition is that the social planner is
interested in the average consumer, whereas the monopolist seeks to serve the
marginal consumer. Therefore, the monopolist locates closer to the marginal
consumer than does the social planner. A higher critical cp supports this idea.
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Figure 5: Comparison between the social planner and the monopolist in
(cp, F)-space ( t - 100).
The oligopoly and free-entry analysis showed that firms on the circle and
a mail order business can coexist as an equilibrium. From Proposition 4, the
number of firms in the free-entry S-equilibrium is larger compared to the M-
equilibrium. This result weakens the familiar proposition that competition cre-
ates too much variety compared to the social optimum (see e.g. Salop (1979)).
Continuing the numerical example, take t- 100, F- 1 and cp - 1. The num-
ber of firms in a Salop model equals 10, whereas only 3.47 firms (of which one
as a mail order business} enter the market in the free-entry M-equilibrium. The
monopolist opens only one mail order business. The free-entry M-equilibrium
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is suboptimal, since firms on the circle and a mail order business appear. In the
social optimum, only one mail order business appears.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined a spatial model on the circle where firms can either sell
by a store or by a mail order business. Selling by a store implies a transporta-
tion cost for the consumers that increases with distance. In contrast, selling
by a mail order business implies a fixed cost for the consumer, regardless of
his location. In a free-entry context, at most one mail order business emerges.
Competition increases and, as a consequence, the number of firms entering the
market is lower, compared to the well-known Salop model. The mail order
business competes with every firm on the circle, and therefore engages in non-
localized competition. The stores on the circle face only one local competitor -
-i.e. the mail order business. In the monopoly and the social optimum, stores
and mail order businesses never appear together.
The result that at most one mail order business will emerge, of course, de-
pends on assumption of homogeneous goods. In addition, there is the implicit
assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the existence of the
mail order business. The model, however, can be modified by introducing ad-
vertisements, for example. Then, consumers are informed about the existence
of the products offered. A mail order business attracts consumers depending on
its advertising costs. In addition, this model assumes that consumers are per-
fectly aware of the quality of the product. If quality inspection before purchase
is costly, a mail order business may have a strategic disadvantage. Finally, in
a multi-country framework, the mail order businesses may be able to use con-
sumers' addresses as a price discriminating device (- yet another interesting
topic for future research).
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) h(3) - 0, obvious. h(N) ) 0 for all N ) 3 if and only if N~( N- 1) )
3~~. Since N~( N- 1) is strictly increasing in N and equals 3~~ at N- 3,
the result follows.
(ii) g(3) 1 0 if and only if t~F C 72. From evaluation of expression (18) at
N- 3, we find that t~F - 72. Since g(N) is strictly increasing, the result
follows.
(iii) g'(N) - h'(N) 1 0 for all N 1 3 if and only if 3t~(2(N -1)2) ) 3~t(3N -
2)~(4N(N - 1)~N). It can easily be checked that this holds for all N~ 3.
(iv) From (i) and (ii), h(3) - 0 and g(3) G 0 if and only if t~F ) 72. Since
g'(N) 1 0 for all finite N and g'(N) - h'(N) ) 0 for all N ) 3 from (iii),
g(N) 1 h(N) for some N) 3. If t~F c 72, then g(3) 1 h(3) - 0. o
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Chapter 4
Price Competition between an
Expert and a Non-expert
4.1 Introduction
This chapter characterizes price competition in a special type of duopoly where
consumers look for a successful match. The two firms are denoted as the expert
and the non-expert. The consumers' match with the expert's good is always
successful. The non-expert's good successfully matches the consumers' needs
only with some commonly known exogenous probability. With the remaining
probability the match is not successful. In other words, the non-expert sells an
experience good: its quality is known only after consumption. All consumers
attach a common positive value to a successful match, but no value in case the
match was unsuccessful. They seek to minimize their expected expenditures.
Therefore, they can go immediately for the expert's good and only face one
purchase decision. Or, they choose for the non-expert's good, anticipating the
risk of an unsuccessful match. In the event of a such a bad match, these
consumers re-enter the market since bygones are forever bygones. If the non-
expert fails to successfully match a consumer's needs, however, another visit
at his store yields no success with probability one. That is, the non-expert's
matching technology is characterized by perfect correlation. Therefore, these
consumers' only choice is to purchase the expert's good. Summing up, the
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consumers make a purchase decision under uncertainty: going directly for the
expert's good may be unnecessary, while buying at the non-expert may turn
out to be a pure waste.
The model applies to the following markets. The first example is competition
between a craftsman and a handyman. A craftsman always repairs successfully.
By contrast, a handyman's repair technology is imperfect. A consumer, there-
fore, may turn to the craftsman after experiencing an unsuccessful match at
the handyman. Second, the model can also be interpreted as competition be-
tween a repair shop and a shop selling new goods. A consumer's decision to
patch up his broken car depends on the probability of successful repair, the
price of patching up, and the price of a new car. Third, the model also shows
some insight regarding price competition between a store selling low quality
and another store selling high quality products: only the low quality store sells
a product that may break down or is incompatible with another product with
some probability. Finally, there is the market for medical services. General
practitioners argue that a mandatory referral prevents patients from a needless
visit to the more expensive specialist. The latter argue, however, that if patients
are allowed to visit the specialist without the mandatory referral of the general
practitioner, it prevents them from making two visits.
We study this problem in a simple horizontal differentiation model and use
Hotelling's line as our framework. The consumers are uniformly distributed
along the unit interval.l The two firms are located at the extremes of this inter-
val; the non-expert is at the left extreme and the expert at the right extreme.
The analysis shows that two types of equilibria can occur. In the first equilib-
rium, some consumers prefer to first visit the non-expert while others directly
visit the expert. This happens when the horizontal differentiation is high enough
and the non-expert's repair technology is sufl'iciently successful. The intuition
is that the expert's residual demand of "failures" becomes very small when the
non-expert becomes a close substitute. This equilibrium is in pure strategies.
lIn the medical services example, the horizontal differentiation component can be inter-
preted as consumers' differences in threshold fear.
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Both firms adopt an "agressive-pricing" strategy since the expert competes in
a direct way with the non-expert. In the second type of equilibrium, the expert
adopts a mixed strategy where he charges with some probability a low price.
With the remaining probability, he charges the monopoly price. In this event,
all consumers first visit the non-expert. The non-expert, however, adopts a pure
strategy given the expert's mixed strategy. In this "mixed-pricing" equilibrium,
the expert's profit is independent of the actual price he charges. This equilib-
rium occurs for low enough degrees of horizontal differentiation and low enough
probabilities of successful repair. When the non-expert's probability of success-
ful repair approaches a critical value, the expert charges his monopoly price
with certainty. In this limiting case, all consumers first visit the non-expert
with certainty. In this event, the expert only serves "failures". That is, only
those consumers who had an unsuccessful match at the non-expert patronize
the expert. In this limiting equilibrium, the firms adopt a"timid-pricing" strat-
egy: the non-expert can charge a high price since the expert finds it optimal to
serve only the failures. The welfare analysis makes clear that when the expert
incurs a cost-disadvantage, the market outcome in pure strategies results in too
many consumers directly visiting the expert. The opposite happens without
cost differences.
Meurer and Stahl (1994) consider a market with two firms, each selling a
horizontally differentiated good. In their model, consumers either experience a
good or a bad match. Consumers experiencing a bad match, however, never
re-enter the market. This chapter, in contrast, allows consumers to re-enter the
market after experiencing a bad match. The consumers are horizontally differ-
entiated and two firms sell a vertically differentiated product. The probability
of a successful match serves as a measure for quality: at equal expenditures
every consumer prefers the expert's good. Meurer and Stahl's (1994) examples
apply in this model if we make some modifications: e.g. low quality machinery
and equipment may break down and become irreparable. The value of a good
match after this breakdown, however, may still be positive. Buying high quality
after the breakdown of the low quality machinery, therefore, can be justified.
In a somewhat different context, Lal and Matutes (1989) consider price compe-
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tition between two stores, each selling the same assortment of two independent
goods. In their model, two types of consumers exist. In one equilibrium, the two
stores charge the same full price for the assortment, but different prices for each
good in the bundle. Poor consumers buy each product at the store charging the
cheapest price and, therefore, re-enter the market after their first purchase at
one of the two stores. Rich consumers, however, never shop around; they never
re-enter the market. In this chapter, there is only one type of consumer. In
addition, the stores sell vertically differentiated goods. Some consumers visit
both firms as they find it ex ante optimal to try out the non-expert's good.
In contrast with most of the literature on credence, experience, or search
goods, this chapter abstracts from sellers' incentives to provide the right amount
of quality in the service, repair, or product offered.2 There is no asymmetric
information or search cost involved in the model. Consumers and producers
know the probability of successful match at the two stores. Their technology is
taken as a given. The chapter also abstracts from the possibility of warranties
for the low quality good. This assumption can be justified as "quality may be
impossible or very costly to measure for a court ... [or] enforcement costs [are]
incommensurate with the íssue" (Tirole (1988), p. 106).
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. 5ection 4.2 offers the
model. The demand analysis follows in Section 4.3, while equilibrium is charac-
terized in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides some welfare considerations. Section
4.6 concludes. Finally, Section 4.7 contains all proofs of the lemmas.
4.2 The Model
Consider a linear market of length one. All consumers are located uniformly
along this interval and own a good needing a repair. All consumers have a
common (reservation) value r for getting the good fixed, and minimize their
2Wolinsky (1993), Emons (1994), and Taylor (1995) analyse features of markets diagnoses
and treatments. The seminal chapter on experience goods is Nelson (1970). Tirole (1988)
offers an overview of models with experience and seazch goods.
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repair expenditures. They incur a linear transportation cost t per unit of length.
The density of consumers is normalized to one. There are two sellers. The first
seller (the non-expert) is located at the left extreme of the interval (x - 0)
and sells at price q. He repairs successfully with probability 0 C ry G 1, and
his marginal cost of production is normalized to zero. The repair technology
is characterized by perfect correlation between two or more visits at the non-
expert's store for every consumer. That is, if the non-expert fails to repair
a consumer's good, a second repair at his store yields failure with probability
one. The other seller (the expert) is located at the other extreme of the interval
(x - 1) and always repairs successfully at price p. The expert has a constant
marginal production cost of c) 0.3 Every consumer has to choose between two
possible actions. The first action is to visit the expert's store immediately. With
this action, the consumer at location z, obtains a surplus of r-p- t(1- x). The
other action is to go to the non-expert first. A successful repair at this store
yields a consumer at location z a surplus of r-q- tz. If the repair was not
successful, another visit at the non-expert's store is useless; the characteristics of
the repair technology imply zero probability of success. Therefore, the consumer
re-enters the market and decides whether to visit the expert's store or not.
Only if he visits the expert's store, the consumer pays the additional amount
of p~ t(1 - z).4 His ex ante expected utility, by consequence, amounts to
r-q-tz-(1-ry)(p~t(1-z)).
Accordingly, the consumer located at y is indifferent between these two actions
if
4fty-~(1-ti)(P~t(1-y))-Pft(1-y)~
where y E [0,1] equals
(ry(P ~ t) - 4)
y (1 f ry)t ~
(1)
3The value of c can be interpreted as the difference between the expert's and the non-
expert's marginal costs.
4 We will assume r to be large enough, so that the option not to visit the expert disappears.
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To complete the set-up of the model, the expert cannot distinguish buyers once
they enter his store: buyers having an unsuccessful repair at the non-expert and
entering the expert's store are identical to consumers following the first action.
This means, the expert cannot make his price contingent on such information.
The next section provides a complete characterization of both firms' demand
function.
4.3 Demand Analysis
For a fixed value of p, say p, the non-expert's (contingent) demand curve is
defined as
0 ifqlry(p-1-t)
Dn(P, 4) - y lf ry(P f t) ~ q J ryp - t
1 ifryp-t1q.
(2)
The non-expert's demand is continuous and píecewise linear. Three possible
price regions have to be distinguished. In the first, the non-expert's demand
equals zero if the consumer located at 0 finds it more profitable to visit the
expert first. In the second, a positive fraction y of the consumers finds it
profitable to visit the non-expert first at a lower price q. Finally, when the price
q is sufficiently low, the non-expert's demand equals one since all consumers
find it profitable to visit him first.
Similarly, for a fixed value q, say q, the expert's (contingent) demand curve
is defined as
0
(1 - ry)(r - p)~t






if (4 f t)~ry ? p?(9~7) - t
if (9~?') - t 1 p.
(3)









1 - 1 De(7~~4)ry
Figure 1: The expert's inverse demand curve.
The expert's demand is continuous and piecewise linear. It consists of five price
regions. In the first constellation of this demand schedule no consumer visits
the expert's store. In the second one, all consumers first visit the non-expert.
More distant consumers, however, prefer not to visit the expert if failure at the
non-expert occurred. For example, the consumer at location 0 will never buy
at the expert's store; doing so would at most yield her negative utility. In the
third constellation, all consumers first visit the non-expert and, if necessary,
buy at the expert. The fourth price constellation of the demand schedule shows
that consumers to the left of y first visit the non-expert and, if necessary, the
expert. The other consumers immediately go to the expert's store. Notice that
the third and fourth price region destroy the concavity in the expert's demand
curve. For extremely low prices, as in the last price region, the expert serves
the whole market.
Figure 1 illustrates the corresponding price regions. As defined in Eq. (3),
it assumes that r- t 1(q f t)~ry. In words, if the expert charges the price
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p- r- t, all consumers first visit the non-expert. That is, at p 1 r- t the
expert can only attract "failures". It follows from the above demand analysis,
that total demand Dn(p, q) -}- De(p, q) in the market varies between 0 and 2- y.
A different situation occurs when (q ~ t)~y ~ r- t. If p- r- t, some
consumers visit the expert directly. In this event, the vertical line of the inverse
demand in Figure 2 at 1- y disappears. If (q ~ t)~ry 1 r- t 1 p, all failures
still visit the expert. If, however, (q f t)~y 1 p~ r- t some consumers who
experienced a bad match at the non-expert do not visit the expert anymore.
In particular, those consumers sufficiently close to zero incur a negative utility
from doing so. Since this chapter aims at discussing when it is optimal for all
consumers to first visit the non-expert before the expert, we will only consider
the situation where (q ,{- t)~ry C r- t. In the next section, Assumptions 1 and
2 make clear that this implies a restriction on the parameters.
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis
From Eq. (2) the non-expert's profit function equals
~n(q, P) - 4Dn(P, 9)
and is continuous and concave in the non-expert's price q.
(4)
Lemma 1: The non-expert's best-response function equals Rn(p) - max(0.5ry(pf
t), ryP - t~.
Lemma 1 implies that if p G p- t(2 f ry)~ry, the non-expert does not serve
the whole market. If, however, p~ p, it is optimal for the non-expert to serve
all consumers. It follows from Lemma 1 that the second part of Eq. (2) of
the non-expert's demand is the only relevant one since he will never set any
9G`YP-torry(Pft)Gq.
Assumption 1: r) 2t f c.
Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-expert 81
Assumption 2: r 1 2t(1 f y)~ry.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the expert would serve the whole market if he
were in a monopoly position. The second assumption implies that if the expert
charges the monopoly price p- r- t, the non-expert finds it optimal to serve
the whole market. In other words, if the expert charges the monopoly price
all consumers find it optimal to first visit the non-expert. If 2t~c ) ry, it is
sufficient if the consumers' reservation value satisfies Assumption 2. Otherwise,
Assumption 1 is sufficient. At price p- r- t, all consumers who had an
unsuccessful match at the non-expert's store find it also optimal to visit the
expert. Therefore, at the monopoly price the expert only serves the failures.
Lemmas 2 and 3 show the implications of Assumption 2 in more detail.
Lemma 2: If the expert charges p' - r- t in equilibrium, then the indífferent
consumer's location is y' - 1.
Lemma 3: If in equilibrium y' - 1, then p' - r- t.
Lemmas 2 and 3 state that the expert charges the monopoly price if and only
if the non-expert serves the whole market.
Lemma 4: In any equilibrium the expert will never charge p" ) r- t or
p' G q`~ry - t.
Lemma 4 implies that the expert will never charge a price exceeding some
consumer's willingness to pay. In addition, the indifferent consumer will never
be to the left of the non-expert's location. From Eq. (3) the expert's profit
function equals
~e(p, 4) - (p - c)De(p, 9)~ (5)
Equation (5) is continuous but non-concave in the expert's price p. From Lemma
4, the expert's price in any equilibrium is between q~y - t and r- t. That is,
only the third and fourth price region in Eq. (3) can occur in equilibrium. Each
part has exactly one maximum. A first possible maximum is in the fourth price
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region. In other words, some consumers go first to the non-expert while others
go directly to the expert. In this price region the expert's profit function is
quadratic and equals
~e(p, q) - (P - c)(1 - ryTJ). (6)
The first-order condition for the r.h.s. of Eq. (6) is defined as
t-{-ry(q~t)-ry2(t-c)
P(q) - p - 2 Z .
7
(7)
The price p(q) is increasing in the non-expert's price q. It is, however, decreasing
in the probability of success of the non-expert. The first-order condition as
defined by Eq. (7) only holds if q~ry - t G p(q) C(q ~ t)~ry. Equivalently, this
first-order condition applies if q~ G q G qh where
qt - 7(c - t) - t(1 - 1~7), (8)
4h - 7c -F t(1 f ry -~ (l~ry)). (9)
Two other cases, therefore, need to be distinguished. First, if q G q~ the expert's
optimal price becomes p- (q ~ t)~y in this part of the profit function. Second,
if qh G q, the expert optimally charges a price p- q~7 - t.
The second possible maximum arises when the expert only attracts "fail-
ures". That is, all consumers first go to the non-expert and, by consequence,
the expert only serves consumers who had an unsuccessful match at the non-
expert. In this event, the expert's demand is given by the third price region in
Eq. (3). If p C r- t, there ís no effect on the expert's demand. The expert's
profit function increases linear in its price p since demand is constant and equal
to 1-ry. Lemma 3 implies that setting p~ r-t is not optimal. This part of the
profit function reaches its maximum at p- r- t. Therefore, if the non-expert
serves the whole market, the expert's profit equals
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~re(r - t, 4) - (r - t - C)(1 - ry). (10)
The expert, therefore, compares the maximum of Eq. (6) with Eq. (10) and
chooses the highest one. Figures 2a - c illustrate the three possible curvatures
of the expert's profit function. Figure 2a shows the case where the first-order
condition applies. For low enough r, the expert's optimal price equals p(q). If,
however, the reservation value r is high enough, the expert optimally charges
the monopoly price of r- t (dashed part). Figure 2b illustrates the case where
q G qi. The profit function shows a positive slope everywhere. From the
continuity of the function, the monopoly price r-t is the unique optimal price.
Finally, Figure 2c shows the case where qh G q. For low values of the consumers'
reservation value, the expert charges p- q~y-t. For high enough r, the expert's
optimal price equals the monopoly price (dashed part).
All this leads to the following lemma about the expert's best response:
Lemma 5: The expert's best response function is either Re(q) - r- t or
Re(q) - max~P(q), 4~?' - t].
In essence, Lemma 5 states that the expert's choice is whether to serve only
failures or not. If he serves only failures, there is no need to compete fiercely
for consumers: an increase in the price p does not affect his demand. Hence,
by charging the monopoly price p- r- t, the expert adopts a"timid-pricing"
strategy. The other choice for the expert is to charge a price as to make some
consumers visit him directly. If the non-expert's price is high, consumers are
more willing to visit the expert's store directly. In this case, by adopting an
"agressive-pricing" strategy, the expert can increase his demand substantially.
Define the function q(.) by
q(7) - 2 t(1- ~y~)(r - t - c) ~ y(c t t) - t(1 t 1~7). (11)
The right hand side of Eq. (11) is the sum of three terms. The first term is
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P
9~1' - t P(9) (9 ~ t)~7 r-t
Figure 2a: The expert's profit function for qr C q C qh.
4~7 - t (4 f t)~7 P(4) r-t
Figure 2b: The expert's profit function for q G ql.
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~e(Pi 9)
p
~(q) qlry - t (9 -~ t)~ry r- t
Figure 2c: The expert's profit function for qh G q.
positíve and decreasing since y c 1, and r- t- c 1 0; the other two terms are
increasing in ry. From Assumption 2, however, the Eq. (11) is only defined for
ry E[ry, l~ where y- 2t~(r - 2t). Note that q(1) - c- t. Finally, define by
q - ry((r - t)(1 - -y) ~ t).
Lemma 6: The expert's best response function is
r-t ifOCqCq~
r- t if qi C q G min(q(y), qh)
p- p(4) íf max(q~, 4(ry)) C 4~ 4h (12)
r-t ifqhGqGq
4~ry - t if max(4h~ 4) C 4.
Lemma 7: It can never occur in equilibrium that (i) q" G q~; (ii) p` - r- t if






Figure 3: The best response functions.
Lemma 7 implies that Figure 2a applies in any equilibrium since the non-
expert's price q` is between q~ G q" C qh. Figure 3 illustrates the parts of
the best response functions that are relevant for an analysis of the equilibrium.
The expert's best response function starts at p- r- t and remains horizontal
for all prices to the left of q(ry). It has a downward jump at q(y) and increases in
a linear way for all q(y) C q G qh. The non-expert's best response is increasing,
continuous, and shows a kink at p- p.
Lemma 8: T6ere is no equilíbrium with p' - r- t and (i) q" - 0.5yr or (ii)
9" C 9(7).
Part (i) implies that it is never optimal for the non-expert not to serve the
whole market when the expert charges the monopoly price. This is a direct
consequence of Assumption 2. Part (ii) states that, in equilibrium, the non-
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expert's best response of Figure 3 is never strictly lower than q(ry). As a matter
of fact, since the expert only serves failures when charging his monopoly price
p` - r- t, the non-expert does not loose any demand when increasing his price
until q' - q(ry).
Lemma 9: If there is an equilibrium with q' - 0.5ry(p` -F t) and p` - p(q'),
then q' ~ q(ry), p` G(q` ~ t)~y, and p' G p.
Proposition 1: There is a 0 G ryÁ C 1 such that some consumers go directly
to the expert if the probability of success y at the non-expert is at least ryA. In
this "agressíve-pricing" equilibrium (pÁ, qA) it holds that q(y) G qA G qh and
ry2(2c - t) f 2ryt ~- 2t
pÁ - 3ry2 , qá - ry~(c ~ t) ~ (1 ~ ry)t.3ry
The non-expert's market share in this "agressive-pricing" equilibrium equals
OC " cry2~(l~ry~ry2)t G1.
yA - 3ryt(1 f y)
(13)
Proof: From Lemma 7, a necessary and sufl'icient condition for pÁ - p(qÁ) to
be the expert's best response is that q(y) G qA. Since pA G(qÁ ~ t)~ry, this
is equivalent to qÁ G qh. Solving Eq. (7) and R„(p) - 0.5ry(p ~- t) yields the
equilibrium prices. The non-expert's market share yÁ follows from substituting
pÁ and qÁ into Eq. (1). In any "agressive-pricing" equilibrium 0 G yA G 1.
Let 0 G ryA G 1 solve yA - 1, it follows from Eq. (13) that ry ~ ryA in any
"agressive-pricing" equilibrium. Finally, for all ry ~ ryA we have that yA is
the unique solution to q(y) - qÁ - 0. From Lemmas 8 and 9, we know that
qA ~ q(~YA), which is satisfied if ry ~ ryA. o
The dotted line in Figure 3 illustrates the non-expert's best response function in
the "agressive-pricing" equilibrium. Some consumers prefer to directly visit the
expert's store. Not surprisingly, pÁ ~ q;~. The expert charges at least as high a
price as the non-expert. The expert's profits, however, exceed the non-expert's
gg Chapter 4
provided c is not too large. Of course, for c- 0 and y- 1, their prices and
profits coincide. Both prices increase with the expert's marginal cost c and the
rate of tranportation cost t. More consumers directly visit the expert when the
cost of transportation increases, while the opposite happens when the expert's
cost increases. Note that when t approaches zero, Eq. (13) does no longer
satisfy the boundaries.
Figures 4a-c illustrate with some representative numerical examples the rel-
evant ranges of y for which an "agressive-pricing" equilibrium exists. The hor-
izontal axis depicts the values for ry. The vertical axis shows the non-expert's
price qÁ from Proposition 1, q(ry) as defined in Eq. (11), and the non-expert's
price ry(r-t)-t when the expert charges his monopoly price. They are indicated
by [1], [2], and [3], respectively. Since any equilibrium must satisfy Assumption
2, a necessary condition is that ry~"ry. In addition, from Lemma 7 we know
that q~ G ry(r - t) - t. Equivalently, ry ~ yl - t~(r - c). Finally, 0 C yA C 1 in
any "agressive-pricing" equilibrium. This is equivalent to yA C y. Therefore,
the horizontal axis is only relevant for values of -y 7 max(y, yi, yA). Figures
4a-c show there is an "agressive-pricing" equilibrium if q(ry) C qÁ. That is, for
all ry ~ yÁ. As an example, take Figure 4a. The probability of success at the
non-expert is at least ryA ti 0.934 in any "agressive-pricing" equilibrium. Thus,
the probability of a successful match of the non-expert should be high enough.
The intuition is that a relatively successful non-expert is a close substitute for
the expert. In other words, the expert's residual demand for "failures" becomes
very small. The attractiveness for the expert of charging the monopoly price,
by consequence, disappears. Figures 4b - c are ínterpreted in a similar way.














Figure 4: The relevant ranges of ry in each equilibrium.
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The entries in Table 1 are the critical values for ryÁ given parametric values of
r, c, and t. In other words, the "agressive-pricing" equilibrium holds for all ry 1
ryÁ. Table 1 illustrates that an increase in the expert's cost c positively affects
the value of ryÁ. The intuition is the following: an increase in the expert's cost
structure, undoubtedly, decreases his profits from serving only "failures". This
practice, however, avoids him being exposed to a weakened competitive position
because of this higher cost structure. Therefore, only a higher probability of
the non-expert's success can make it more profitable for the expert to directly
compete with the non-expert. This explains the positive relationship between
c and ryÁ. An increase in the cost of transportation t, however, makes it less
attractive for both sellers to serve the whole market and, therefore, negatively
affects yA.
t-1 t-2
c - 0 0.934 0.770
c - 1 0.967 0.820
Table 1: Critical values for yA (for r- 10).
Proposition 2: There is no equilibrium in pure strategies if the probability of
success is smaller than ryA. T6at is, if qÁ G q(ry) G ry(r - t) - t.
Proof: Suppose there is an "agressive-pricing" equilibrium in pure strategies
such that ry G yA, or equivalently qÁ G q(y). From Lemma 6, it follows that
the expert's best response is to charge r- t. From Lemma 2, however, the
non-expert's best reply then equals ry(r - t) - t. But q(ry) G ry(r - t) - t. A
contradiction. ~
Figures 4a-c illustrate Proposition 2: for max(ry", ry~, ryA) C ry C yA there exists
no equilibrium in pure strategies. In words, for low enough probabilities of
successful repair an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist. In addition,
when the cost of transportation t decreases, the critical value ryÁ increases. That
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is, a lower degree of horizontal differentiation increases the range of ry-values for
which an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist. The non-existence of
an equilibrium in pure strategies results from the non-concavity of the expert's
profit function. The expert is indifferent between charging pÁ and his monopoly
price r- t only if the non-expert sets the price q(ry). The non-expert, however,
optimally charges another price in response to the expert's prices. The dashed
best-response function for the non-expert in Figure 3 illustrates Proposition
2. As the dashed line passes through the discontinuous part of the expert's
best response, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.s Proposition 3, however,
shows that for these values of ry, there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies.
Proposition 3: If qÁ C q(ry) C y(r - t) - t, there exists a unique "mixed-
pricing" equilibrium (p1y, qM, a'). In this equilibrium the expert charges his
monopoly price p- r- t with probability ~'. In this event, al] consumers first
visit the non-expert. With the remaining probability 1- a', the expert charges
pjy - p(q;y). The non-expert charges q;y - q(ry) with probability one.
Proof : If the non-expert charges q(ry), we know that the expert is indifferent
between charging r-t or p(q). Since his profits are exactly identical, the expert
is as well indifferent by charging these two prices with any probability cY and
1- a, respectively. From the non-expert's best response, the non-expert's profit
is increasing in his price for all q G ql (see Figure 3), irrespective the price p
charged by the expert. For all prices ql G q G Q2 (see Figure 3), the non-expert's
profit is decreasing in its price when p- p(q) but increasing when p- r- t.
For all Q2 C q, the non-expert's profit is decreasing in p. Thus, for all prices
ql C q C q2, there exists a unique value a' such that the non-expert's marginal
profit equals zero. Since ql G q(y) G q2i this also holds for q(ry). Uniqueness
results from the non-expert's concave profit function and that the expert only
wants to randomize when the non-expert charges q(ry). Since q(ry) C ry(r-t)-t,
it follows from Assumption 2 that all consumers first visit the non-expert when
the expert charges his monopoly price. [7
SKrishna's (1989) model has identical features in the context of voluntary export restric-
tions (see also Krugman (1989)).
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Harsanyi (1973) provides a rationale for the above "mixed-pricing" equilib-
rium by constructing a related "disturbed" game. In this disturbed game, the
expert's cost structure c is subject to some exogenous random shock, the value
of which the expert knows with certainty. In contrast, the non-expert faces
uncertainty about its exact value. In addition, suppose the non-expert beliefs
that the expert's costs are uniformly distributed around c. Then, in the limit,
as these pay-off related disturbances vanish, the non-expert's beliefs approach
the mixed strategy equilibrium. In other words, Harsanyi interprets the prob-
abilities with which the expert "randomizes" in the mixed strategy context,
as the non-expert's "rate of ignorance" about the expert's cost structure. In
this sense, the expert's "randomizing" behavior gets purified and, therefore,
becomes completely deterministic.
As a limiting case of Proposition 3, there is a"timid-pricing" equilibrium
(pT, qT) when a~ 1. In this equilibrium pT - r- t and qT - ry(r - t) - t if
0 G qT - q(ry). From Eq. (12) in Lemma 6, the expert's best response, indeed,
equals pT - r- t if 0 G qT G q(y). From Lemma 2, the non-expert's best
response is qT - ry(r - t) - t if pT - r- t. The dark line of the non-expert's
best response in Figure 3 illustrates this limiting case. In this limiting case, the
indifferent consumer is located at yT - 1. That is, all consumers first visit the
non-expert and the expert only serves the failures. Both firms adopt a"timid-
pricing" strategy: the non-expert can charge a very high price since the expert
charges his monopoly price. The expert's profit equals (r - t- c)(1 - ry) and
the non-expert's profit is y(r - t) - t.
4.5 Welfare
This section compares the "agressive-pricing" equilibrium with the social opti-
mum. The social planner chooses the indifferent consumer y - yyy such as to
minimize total costs C:
i y
min fyW tydy ~ f t(I - y)dy ~ f W(1 --y)t(1 - y)dy -F (1 - ryy~,y)c. (14)
yH, o y~, o
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The first term in Eq. (14) is the total transportation costs of all consumers
going first to the non-expert. The second term is interpreted similarly, but
for all consumers going directly to the expert. The third term represents the
transportation costs of all consumers who, because of failure at the non-expert,
visit the expert. Finally, the last term shows the expert's total costs.




In words, the indifferent consumer's location becomes closer to the expert's
location if the probability of a successful repair at the non-expert increases
(óyy'y~óry 1 0). Also, an increase in the expert's marginal cost augments the
fraction of consumers that first visits the non-expert (óyyy~óc ~ 0). Finally,
an increase in the cost of transportation decreases the proportion of consumers
going to the non-expert first (áy'~ót G 0). The indifferent consumer is in the
interior if ry G t~c. Substituting this into Eq. (14), one arrives at an optimal
social cost
C, - ry2(t ~ ~)2 ~ 0.5t - ry2(t
~ ~) ~ ( 1 - ry2(t ~ C) )c.- 2(1-~ -y)t 1 ~ ry (1 ~ ry)t
The total surplus in the first best solution is then simply r- C. If the social
planner can control both prices, the first best solution can easily be achieved:
each pair of prices resulting in the indifferent consumer located at yyy is optimal.
Suppose the social planner can only control the expert's price.s Then, the first
best solution can still be achieved. This can readily be seen from Eqs. (1)
and (15), where y- yyy if q- ry(p - c). Since the non-expert's best response
is continuous, there exists a unique intersection. Following Meurer and Stahl
(1994), this is the constrained effiicient outcome. By contrast, if the social
planner can only control the non-expert's price, the first best solution is not
sThis may be of interest when only the expert has an official licence for repairing and the
non-expert illegally offers repair-services.
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necessarily obtained.' If p- q~ry ~- c passes through the discontinuous part of
the expert's best response, either too many or too few consumers directly visit
the non-expert.
Before stating the next proposition, define
t f t2 ~ 8t(c -~ t)
ryW - 4(c f t) ~
(16)
The right hand side of Eq. (16) is increasing in the rate of transportation cost t;
in addition, it approaches zero when t vanishes. It is decreasing in the expert's
marginal cost c and approaches one when c tends to zero.
Proposition 4: A socially efficient proportion ofconsumers first visits the non-
expert in the "agressive-prícing" equilibrium only when ry- ryyy and ryÁ C ryyy.
If ryÁ G ry G ryy'~,, too few consumers first visit the expert from an efficíency point
of view. If max(ryÁ, ryyy) G ry, too many consumers first visit the expert.
Proof: The proportion of consumers in the "agressive-pricing" equilibrium of
Eq. (13) and in the socially efficient outcome of Eq. ( 15) depends on ry. For
positive values of y, the r.h.s. of these two equations are identical only when
y- yyy. The socially right amount of consumers first visit the non-expert if and
only if yA - yyy, or equivalently when ry- ry~,y. Of course, in any "agressive-
pricing" equilibrium y~ yA. As a result, too few consumers first visit the
expert when y~y G yA, that is for yA G y G ry~y. Similarly, too many consumers
first visit the expert when yA C yyy, that is for max(ryA, ry~,y) G y. O
The entries in Table 2 are the ry-values for which the market outcome coin-
cides with the socially efficient outcome given the parametric values of r, c, and
t. Table 2 shows that in the numerical examples where c- 0, the probabil-
ity of success at which the market outcome coincides with the socially efficient
outcome is ryyy - 1. By consequence, a comparison with Table 1 makes clear
that ry;y G 1. That is, when there are no cost differences, not enough con-
'This may be of interest when the expert has his location outside the social planner's area
of control; e.g. abroad.
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sumers directly visit the expert in any "agressive-pricing" equilibrium from an
efficiency point of view. In contrast, when c- 1, a comparison of Tables 1 and
2 illustrates that max(yyy, ryA) - yA G ry. In words, in the "agressive-pricing"
equilibrium with a cost difference, too many consumers first visit the expert.
All consumers between yj,y and yA should, from an eíficiency point of view, first
visit the non-expert: the cost disadvantage results in the expert charging too
agressively a price.
t-1 t-2
c - 0 1.000 1.000
c - 1 0.640 0.767
Table 2: Market outcome is efficient for ry - ryyy (for r- 10).
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has characterized price competition between an expert and a non-
expert. In contrast with the expert, the non-expert's repair technology is not
always successful. In a location framework, consumers require a successful re-
pair and seek to minimize their expected expenditures. In the event of an
unsuccessful match at the non-expert, the consumer re-enters the market and
visits the expert. This simple framework offers the following insights: when
the non-expert's repair technology is suffiiciently successful, both sellers charge
a low and deterministic price. Indeed, the non-expert's low number of failures
does not make it attractive for the expert to charge the monopoly price. By
doing this, he would only serve those consumers who had an unsuccessful match
at the non-expert. In this equilibrium, both sellers charge a deterministic price
and some consumers first visit the expert. When the non-expert's repair tech-
nology is relatively unsuccessful, the higher number of failures increases the
profitability of the expert's residual demand. In equilibrium, the expert ran-
domizes between the monopoly price and a low price. The non-expert, however,
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charges a deterministic price. If the expert charges his monopoly price, all con-
sumers first visit the non-expert. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that the
market outcome in pure strategies results in too few consumers directly visiting
the expert when there are no cost differences. In contrast, too many consumers
directly visit the expert when there are cost differences.
The following modification to the simple model deserves a short discussion.
Suppose the expert considers to price discriminate between the consumers who
first visited the non-expert's store (the failures) and those who directly visit his
store. Two scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, only failures can prove
they first visited the non-expert. These failures should be charged the highest
price: the non-expert's repairing technology is such that failures can only go
to the expert's store for successful repair. In other words, the expert has a
monopoly position with respect to the failures. The failures, certainly, must
be given an incentive (a discount) to reveal themselves. Offering a discount to
the failures, however, increases the number of consumers first visiting the non-
expert. Both the discount and its effect on the indifferent consumer decrease
the expert's profit. Therefore, in this scenario it is not optimal for the expert
to price discriminate. In the second scenario, the failures cannot hide having
visited the non-expert. Hence, the expert could charge these consumers a higher
price. Clearly, more consumers will prefer to directly visit the expert. This
moves the position of the indifferent consumer to the left (the demand effect).
The non-expert, however, will reduce his price (the strategic effect). A priori,
it is not clear whether the expert optimally should price discriminate.
The strategic decision whether to become an expert or a non-expert is an
important issue. Likewise, the probability of successful repair could be endog-
enized. These, however, seriously affect the complexity of the model.
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4.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Since Eq. (4) is concave in q, the non-expert's best
response is q- 0.5ry(p ~ t) for any y E [0, 1]. From Eq. (2), however, a
necessary condition is that ry(p -}- t) ) 0.5y(p ~- t) ) ryp - t. The first inequality
is always satisfied. If the second is not satisfied, the non-expert's demand equals
1. Accordingly, the best response is yp - t. o
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose y' C 1 and the non-expert charges q' in equi-
librium. Then Eq. (1) implies ( yr - q') C (1 f ry)t. After rearranging and,
from Lemma 1, substituting q" - 0.5ryr, one has r G (2t(1 ~- ry)~ry), contradict-
ing Assumption 2. Suppose y' ~ 1. This, however, cannot occur in equilib-
rium, since the non-expert can increase his price without affecting demand until
q' - ry(r - t) - t. 5ubstitution yields the desired result. This proves Lemma 2.
0
Proof of Lemma 3: From Eq. (1), y' - 1 implies ry(p" f t) - q` -(1 -~ y)t,
or equivalently, yp' - t - q`. From the non-expert's best response function (see
Lemma 1), it follows that p' ) p. The expert's demand equals 1- ry if y' - 1.
From Assumption 1, it is optimal for the expert to serve the whole market if he
were in a monopoly position. Assumption 2 guarantees that p" - r- t~ p. ~
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose the expert charges p` 1 r- t. From Eq.
(3), his profit equals (p' - c)(1 - y)(r - p')~t. For all p 1 r- t, marginal
profit is non-positive since r 1 2t f c by Assumption 1. Suppose the expert
charges p' C q'~ry - t. This is equivalent with y C 0. As long as y C 0, the
expert can charge a price p~ p` while his demand remains at 1. Therefore,
r-tlpi?4~1'-t. ~
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Proof of Lemma 5: Define
F(R q) -(P - c)[1 -
ryry(P f t) - 4](1 f ry)t
For a given q, the expert can set p such that y- 1. By Lemma 3, the optimal
p- r- t. If the expert sets p such that y G 1, he maximizes F(p, q) -
(p-c)(1-ryy) subject to the constraint that y~ 0. By the first-order condition
for profit maximization this yields p- max [p(q), q~ry - t]. ~
Proof of Lemma 6: By Lemma 5, the expert charges either p- r- t or
p- max[p(q),q~ry-t]. Ifp(q) 1(q~t)~ry, or equivalently q G q~, the indifferent
consumer is at 1. This is Figure (26). Then, from Lemma 3, the expert's best
response is p- r- t. By the envelope theorem, maxpF(p, q) - F(p(q), q) and
is strictly increasing in q~ 0. The equation F(p(q), q) -(r - t- c)(1 - ry)
has the solution q(ry) over the range where dF(p(q), q)~dq 1 0. By Lemma
4, the expert never charges a price p~ r- t. Therefore, the expert's best
response equals r- t if q G min(q(ry), qh). Figure (2a) illustrates the case
where qi C q C min(q(y), qh). Suppose first that min(q(ry), qh) - q(y). Then,
if max(q~, q(ry)) - q~, the second part of Eq. (12) does not exist and for any
q~ G q G qh, the expert's best response is p(q). This is illustrated in Figure
(2a). If, however, max(q~, q(ry)) - q(ry), the second part of Eq. (12) does
exist. The expert's best response is p(q) if q(ry) G q G qh. Second, suppose
min(q(ry),qh) - qh, then max(q~,q(ry)) - q(ry) since q~ G qh. It then follows
that the third part of Eq. (12) does not exist. If q 1 qh, the expert charges an
optimal price of p - r- t for all q G q-~y((r - t)(1 - ry) -}- t). Otherwise, he
charges p - q~ry - t. This is Figure (2c). ~
Proof of Lemma 7: Suppose (i) is part of an equilibrium. This is equivalent
to q' G ryp' - t, contradicting Lemma 1. Suppose (ii) occurs in equilibrium.
Since qh C q' is equivalent to p' C q"~ry - t we know from Lemma 2 and 3 that
if p' - r- t, the non-expert charges q' - ry(r - t) - t. Substitution then yields
r- t C(ry(r - t) - t)~ry - t. A contradiction. Suppose (iii) occurs in equilibrium
from which q" - ry(p' f t). From Lemma 1, we know that the non-expert's best
response is max[0.5ry(p' f t), ryp' - t]. A contradiction. ~
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Proof of Lemma 8: If q` - 0.5ryr, then from Lemma 1, it must follow that
0.5ryr 1-y(r - t) - t. Equivalently, r G 2t(1 f ry)~ry, contradicting Assumption
2. This proves part (i). Suppose the non-expert charges a price q" G q(ry).
From Lemma 6, the expert charges p- r- t if q C q(ry). By slightly increasing
his price, the non-expert can increase his profit without loosing any demand.
Therefore q' G q(y) cannot be part of an equilibrium. This proves part (ii). ~
Proof of Lemma 9: Suppose q` G q(ry), then from Lemma 6, the expert's best
response is to charge p- r- t. But then, the non-expert best response equals
q- ry(r - t) - t. From Lemma 7, p" ) (q" f t)~ry can never be an equilibium.
Finally, suppose p" 1 p, then y" - 1 from Lemma 1. It follows from Lemmas 2
and 3 that q` - ryp' - t. A contradiction. ~
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Chapter 5




This chapter is concerned with two regimes in a market where suppliers `wait at
stand' for customers to arrive. In the first regime suppliers simultaneously offer
their good or service for sale. Customers may randomly select a supplier. In
such a`random-market', trade can take place upon mutual agreement between
the trading partners, whatever the supplier's position in the queue. The other
regime is based on the so-called `first-come first-served' or `first-in first-out'
(FIFO) principle. In such a FIFO-market, suppliers sequentially offer their
good or service. This second regime has a unique market feature since the
suppliers' positions in the queue determine the exact sequence of their trading
opportunities. Upon his arrival in the market, a customer's trading partner
ranks in front of the queue.
We illustrate these two forms of market organization with some examples.
The first example is the market where taxis wait at stand. In the random-
market, customers can upon arrival choose any taxi at their disposal. In con-
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trast, customers must pick the first taxi in line in the FIFO-market. Airports are
by far the largest cab stand markets (see Teal and Berglund (1987)). Frankena
and Pautler (1984) report that high fares at airport cab stands called for revi-
sion in the FIFO-system of queuing. The inland waterways transport market
for freight is the second example. In some European countries, the loading of
barges and cargoes shows some organizational features like in the market where
taxis wait at stand. The Rhine inland waterways transport market between
The Netherlands and Germany is organized as a random-market: shippers can
choose any available barge whatever its position in the queue. The so-called
tour de róle system obliges shippers to first deal with the barge in front of
the queue. This FIFO-system particularly concerns the North-South inland
waterways transport market between The Netherlands, Belgium, and France.
It affects about 15 per cent of the total inland waterways transport market.
Recently, the EU-Commission has claimed that its attempt to realise the full
potential of its inland waterways has been hampered by restrictive practices.
The Commission has passed judgment on this tour de róle system as anti-
competitive behavior. The third example concerns the labor market where
unemployed people in some cases are served on a first-come first-served basis.
Governmental agencies engaged in matching labor supply and demand often
give priority to people with a long duration unemployment history. Finally, in
the (regulated) housing market, some (governmental) agencies apply the same
kind of inechanism: available housing is offered first to people who appeared as
the first on the waiting list.
In each of these FIFO-markets, the right to maintain prior service differs to
some degree. In the taxi-example, customers can only negotiate with the first
available taxi in the line. In the waterways transport market, shippers deal first
with the bargeman in front of the queue. Upon disagreement, the shipper may
switch to the second barge ín the line, and so on. In the event of disagreement,
however, the barges are allowed to maintain their position during 60 days. In
the Dutch regulated housing market, the person with rank one cannot maintain
the first position after having refused two times. The longer the right to keep
this first position after disagreement, the better is one's bargaining position.
Bargaining in Markets 103
This chapter will mainly have a market in mind that looks like the taxi-market.
We compare the outcome of the negotiation in both regimes and investigate
whether the two regimes can coexist in a market equilibrium. Prices will be
determined through bilateral negotiations. The customer and supplier will share
the gains from trade according to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Of
course, each regime will influence the gains from trade in a particular way. The
two regimes dealt with in the chapter, indeed, imply different alternatives for
one or the other trading partner. Each regime determines the customer's and
supplier's `disagreement point', and hence, each party's bargaining position.l
In the random-market, the trading partners are involved in a partial bilateral
monopoly situation. It gives the supplier a weak bargaining position. The
FIFO-market, however, generates a bilateral monopoly situation between the
trading partners. In consequence, the negotiated outcome in the FIFO-market
is higher than in the random-market. Suppliers' expected payoff in the FIFO-
regime, however, is not always preferred to that in the random-regime. In the
FIFO-market, every supplier has a positive expected current payoff only when
ranking first. Otherwise, his current payoff equals zero. By contrast, in the
random-market, all suppliers have a positive expected payoff in each period.
Since waiting is costly, suppliers in the FIFO-market facing a long waiting time
may consider to join the random-market, despite the lower negotiated outcome
in this market. Thus, consider suppliers making a mutually exclusive choice
between a random-market and a FIFO-market. When customers cannot choose
between these two markets, the market equilibrium always has the property that
there are suppliers in both markets. The ratio of suppliers in the random-market
to the FIFO-market becomes infinitely large as the total number of suppliers
approaches infinity.
The above examples all have the typical properties of a search market: cus-
tomers observe prices only at some cost. In the taxi market, ca.b-riders face
high transaction costs in finding the lowest fare. In particular, the market
1See Shaked and Sutton (1984) for a non-cooperative approach to bargaining with outside
options.
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segments of cruising taxis and taxis using stands (at locations such as air-
ports, railway stations, and hotels) seem to impede price competition.2 The
`monopoly'-paradox of Diamond (1971) predicts that even with negligibly small
(but positive) search costs and a large number of sellers, the equilibrium mar-
ket price equals the monopoly price.3 Diamond's analysis, however, presumes
that sellers set prices and consumers act as price takers. That is, prices are set
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Bargaining, as another term of trade, provides
a way out of Diamond's extreme prediction.4 Bester (1993, 1994) studies the
equilibrium determination of these two pricíng rules. This chapter studies how
the organization of supply determines the outcome of the negotiation.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, we present
a simple model that permits to compute the negotiated outcome for the `ran-
dom' and `first-in first-out' market organization. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 analyse
the outcome for the two market organizations. The stability of the `first-in
first-out' market against the `random'-market organization is shown in Section
5.5. 5ection 5.6 makes some concluding remarks.
5.2 The Model
The number of suppliers equals N~ 1 in each period and all suppliers are
identical. Each supplier offers one unit of service. The unit cost of production
equals c~ 0. A market is composed of identical customers. In each period,
exactly one customer arrives with probability 0 G b G 1 in the market. With
the remaining probability no customer enters the market. The customer's reser-
vation value equals r) c. Each customer buys at most one supplier-service.
Communication occurs only during trade and exactly between one supplier and
2The lazgest market segment in the U.S., however, is the radio-dispatched or telephone
order market. It accounts for 70oI'o to 80010 ot the total taxi market. In this market aegment,
price advertising is much more intensive and offers a reasonable explanation for the difference
in degree of competitiveness.
3This will be the case in both the random and `first-in first-out' market.
4See Diamond (1989) for an overview.
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one customer. Both bargain about the price. If the customer finds the price not
attractive enough, he can switch to another supplier. An alternative option is
to leave the market, the value of which is normalized to zero.s Switching from
one of the N suppliers to another or leaving the market takes one unit of time.
The customer discounts every unit of time with a factor 0 G a G 1. Switching,
therefore, is costly. Of course, the customer's decision for switching to another
supplier depends on the price pe he expects to pay upon agreement at another
supplier. If the supplier finds the price unattractive, he can wait for the next
customer or leave the market. The supplier discounts future revenues by a fac-
tor 0 G,Q G 1. Thus waiting for the next customer is a costly action. The
customers' and suppliers' price expectations are rational. The analysis focuses
on two different regimes of market organization where suppliers wait at stand:
the random system and the first-in-first-out ( FIFO) queue system. In the first
regime, customers make their selection ad random since all suppliers look alike.
Trade can take place upon agreement between customer and the selected sup-
plier. In the event of disagreement a customer again randomly picks a supplier.
By contrast, in the FIFO-regime a customer must select the first available sup-
plier. Thus, when all suppliers are available, an entering customer has to take
the supplier first in line. If the first supplier is not available, an entering cus-
tomer has to take the second supplier in line, and so on. Disagreement between
two trading partners implies that the customer may not switch to a supplier
with another position. More precisely, in the event of disagreement the cus-
tomer has to select again the same supplier in the next period. To summarize:
all customers have to select the first available supplier and upon disagreement
stick to that same supplier.s The organization of supply, therefore, determines
SThe customer may leave the market and switch to a substitute such as public transit in
the case of taitis.
aIn the queueing literature suppliera can be interpreted as servers. Each regime is described
by B~T~n~FCFS~oo~oo. The first charactetiatic B denotes the nature of the arrival process
for customers; in this model the arrival process follows a binomial distribution. The second
characteristic T specifies the nature of the setvice times and follows some distribution. The
third characteristic n is the number of parallel servers. In the random-regime this number
n coincides with the number N of suppliets, while in the FIFO-regime this number n equals
one. The fourth characteristic deacribes the customers' queue discipline. This model assumes
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the customer's and supplier's `disagreement point'. Trade can take place upon
agreement between the two parties. Finally, all parties are risk-neutral and
maximize their expected payoffs.
As stated above, the number of suppliers in the market is constant. The
reason is that we want to focus on the steady state. In other words, a new
supplier arrives only if one supplier had an agreement with a customer and left
the stand. The number of suppliers, therefore, can be treated as a constant.
The assumption of a constant number of suppliers is similar to Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985). There, agents of opposite types are matched according to
some meeting technology and leave the market after reaching an agreement.
They assume that the equilibrium flow of departures is exactly equal to the
exogenous arrival flow of new agents of both types.
5.3 The `Random'-market
In the random-regime, a customer has the choice between randomly selecting
a supplier S or leaving the market upon arrival at the location where suppliers
wait at stand. In case of selecting a supplier S, the customer can find out
the price only through bilateral negotiation. In the event of disagreement, the
customer can stay in the market and, before a potentially entering new customer
arrives, again select ad random one of the N suppliers in the next period. In
other words, the customer re-enters the market as if he entered for the first
time.7 In this next period, the customer anticipates agreement at price pe.
Therefore, in the event of disagreement his expected discounted payoff from
that customers are served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. The fifth specifies the
maximum allowable number of customera in the system. Finally, the sixth characteristic refers
to the size of the population from which customers aze drawn (Winston, 1994).
~In an alternative setting, the customer can follow the strategy not to pick that particular
supplier anymore in the event of disagreement; that is, he selects one of the N- 1 remaining
suppliers. Of course, this improves the customer's bargaining position when N~ 2. It,
however, does not affect the results fundamentally. The reason for chooaing this particular
setting is to introduce as much symmetry as possible compared to the FIFO-market. In
addition, it makes the analysis somewhat cleaner.
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selecting one of the N suppliers equals
vB - max[0, a(r - pe)) (1)
since leaving the market yields a zero surplus. One may wonder why Eq. (1)
contains only a single pe. Two situations can be distinguished. First, suppose
there is no customer in the market. An entering customer can choose one of the
N suppliers. His disagreement point is also determined by N suppliers. Second,
suppose there is a customer in the market. A new entering customer can choose
one of the N- 1 available suppliers. Each of these two customers anticipate
the other will reach an agreement at price p~ - this anticipation is correct in
equilibrium. Therefore, their disagreement points are also determined by N
suppliers and exactly coincide with the first case.
In the event of agreement, the selected supplier S receives the expected
payoff ws. It contains two terms. First, before a customer has arrived, this
supplier will be matched with probability b~N. If so, this yields an expected
gain of pe - c. Second, with the remaining probability 1- b~N there is no
match either because no customer arrived at all or there was a match with
another supplier S'. In that case supplier S has to wait until the next period
and arrives in exactly the same situation as before with the expected payoff of
ws. Therefore,
ws - b(pe - c)~N f (1 - b~N),~ws. (2)
If, however, supplier S is matched but disagreement occurs, his expected dis-
counted payoff equals vs. In this event, the current customer again selects one
of the N suppliers, before a potentially entering new customer picks a supplier.
After the current customer has randomly chosen a supplier, the new customer,
if any, can choose from the N-1 remaining suppliers. Therefore, the supplier's
discounted expected payoff from disagreement equals
vs - max(0, ~(pe - c)] if N- 1 (3)
max[0, Q((1 f 6)(pe - c)~N -~ (I - (1 f b)~N),Ows)~ if N 1 2
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since the supplier's option to leave the market yields a zero surplus. In the
first part of Eq. (3), i.e. if N - 1, the supplier and customer are involved
in a bilateral monopoly situation: the supplier can only negotiate with one
customer and the current customer can pick the supplier before any potentially
new entering customer. Therefore, in the event of disagreement, both must
continue bargaining with each other in the next period. Part two applies if the
number of sellers equals N~ 2. It contains two terms: in the first term the
current customer or the potentially new entering customer selects this same
supplier S with probability (1 f 6)~N. If so, this yields an expected surplus of
pe - c in the next period. The second term explains that with the remaining
probability (1-(1-~b)~N), the current customer and the new entering customer
(if any) pick another supplier S' in the next period. Since customers anticipate
agreement at any other supplier S' in this next period, supplier S gets the
discounted payoff ws. Thus, supplier and customer are involved in a partial
bilateral monopoly situation: In the event of disagreement, there is a positive
probability that the current supplier will not be matched in the next period.
Rearranging Eq. (2) and substitution into part two of Eq. (3) yields
max[0„Q(pe - c)] if N- 1
vs - max[0, ~3(1 - Q-}- b)(pe - c)~(N(1 - Q) ~ Q6)] if N 1 2.
(4)
A supplier's expected payoff in the event of disagreement approaches zero as
the probability of any customer choosing this particular supplier tends to zero
(N --~ oo). Similarly, when the probability of a new customer entering the
market approaches zero (b --~ 0), the supplier's expected payoff in the event
of disagreement becomes ~3(pe - c)~N. The disagreement point v- (vB, vs)
determines the surplus to the customer and the supplier, respectively, in case
the bilateral negotiation breaks down. Both parties have an incentive to reach
an agreement if the net surplus
r-vB-vs-c (5)
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is non-negative.8 To determine the outcome of the bargaining process, assume
that the customer and the supplier share the net surplus from reaching an
agreement equally as in the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Nash (1950)
has provided axiomatic foundations for this solution. Binmore, Rubinstein,
and Wolinsky (1986) have shown that the non-cooperative alternating offer
bargaining model à la Rubinstein (1982) approaches Nash's axiomatic bargain-
ing solution for the limiting case when the probability of an exogenous break-
down converges to zero. From the symmetric Nash bargaining solution concept,
the customer receives his disagreement point vB plus half of the net surplus
r-vB-vs-c.
Therefore, the outcome p of the price negotiation satisfies the equation
r-p-0.5(r-vB-vs-c)fva. (6)
Definition 1: The outcome p is a random-market equilibrium if Eq. (6) is
satisfied where vB and vs are as defined in Eqs. (1) and (4) such that (i)
r- p 1 vB and p- c~ vs; and (ii) p- pe 1 c, v 1 0.
Part (i) is necessary to guarantee that customers and suppliers find it profitable
to enter the market. Part (ii) guarantees that the outcome of the negotiation in
the random-market equals at least the marginal cost c and satisfies Eq. (6), to-
gether with the rational expectations assumption and the disagreement points.
To state the first proposition, define the parameter
R- a(1-a~-~)
N(1 - Q) f pb'
Proposition 1: There is a unique random-market equilibrium p. In this market
equilibrium agreement is reached and given by
r(1 - a) f c(1 - Q) r(1 - a) f c(1 - R)
p- if N-1, and p- if N)2.2-a-Q 2-cr-R
(7)
sIn equilibrium, this will be the case as the reader may easily verify.
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Proof: From Eqs. (1), (4), and the assumption that pe - p, the outcome
of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution is defined by Eq. (6) if the first
inequality in (i) is satisfied. Since r 1 c, this first inequality in (i) is satisfied.
Therefore, the customer's disagreement point is vB - a(r - p). Straightforward
calculations show that the second inequality in (i) is always satisfied. Since
r 1 c, the first inequality in (ii) is satisfied. Therefore, v~ 0 and agreement
must be reached. Finally, when p- pe, the solution to Eq. (6) is unique and
equivalent to Eq. (7). O
The outcome p when N- 1 is independent of the probability ó customers enter
the market. The intuition is that once a customer has entered the market,
the supplier knows with certainty he will be matched in the next period in the
event of disagreement. Therefore, the probability of a new customer entering
the market has no effect on the supplier's disagreement point. The supplier and
customer are involved in a bilateral monopoly situation.
The outcome p when N 1 2 has the following properties. An increase in
the probability ó with which customers enter the market positively affects p.
The intuition is that customer and supplier are involved in a partial bilateral
monopoly and an increase in b augments the supplier's disagreement point.
An increase in the number of suppliers N, however, decreases the supplier's
probability of being matched. This affects the supplier's disagreement point
negatively and thus decreases p. In the limit when N-~ oo, the right hand side
of Eq. ( 7) equals ( r(1 - a) -f- c)~(2 - a) and is thus independent of ,(3 and ó.
If, moreover, in the limit a~ 1, the negotiated outcome approaches marginal
cost c. When a, ~3, ó-~ 1, the outcome approaches (r ~- c(N - 1))~N.
5.4 The FIFO-market
If the supplier's market is organized as a FIFO-system, every supplier has a
well-defined position in the queue. Upon his arrival at the location where sup-
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pliers wait at stand, the customer has two alternatives. The first is to leave the
market, yielding a zero surplus. The other alternative obliges the customer to
pick the first supplier in the queue. In case of selecting this first supplier, the
customer can find out the price only through bilateral negotiation. If this cur-
rent customer finds the negotiated price unattractive, he can stay in the market
or leave the market. As in the random-market, this current customer picks a
supplier before a potentially new customer enters. Since the market is organized
as a FIFO-system, the current customer has to continue the bargaining in the
next period with the same supplier. In this next period, a new customer has
to select the supplier with rank two in the queue if the current customer has
not reached an agreement.9 If, however, both customers cannot reach an agree-
ment, they both continue bargaining with the same supplier and another new
customer selects the supplier with rank three, and so on. The bargaining sur-
plus is available upon agreement. In this FIFO-market, both trading partners
are involved in a bilateral monopoly situation. In consequence, the customer's
and supplier's expected payoff in the event of disagreement equals
vB - max[0, a(r - pe)], v's - max[0, ~3(p~ - c)], (8)
respectively. The disagreement point v- ( vB, vs) represents the surplus to the
customer and the supplier, respectively, in case the bilateral negotiation breaks
down. The net surplus from reaching an agreement in the FIFO-market is
r-vB-v's-c (9)
and must be non-negative.lo In the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, the
outcome p of the price negotiation satisfies the equation
9This way of modelling is a fairly robust set-up: suppose that when a potentially new
customer has arrived, he chooses with probability 0 G p G 1 before the current customer. If,
however, no new customer has arrived, the current customer has to continue the bazgaining
with the first supplier. In this set-up, the supplier first in rank has with probability one a cus-
tomer in the next period. Similarly, since all suppliers are alike, the customer's disagreement
point remains the same.
loThis will be the case in equilibrium.
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r-p-0.5(r-vB-vs-c)fvB. (10)
Definition 2: The outcome p is a FIFO-market equilibrium if Eq. (10) is
satisfied where vB and vs are as defined in Eq. (8) such that (i) r-p~ vB and
p-c~v`S and(ii)p-pe ~c, v10.
The interpretation of (i) and ( ii) is similar to the conditions in Definition 1.
Proposition 2: There is a unique FIFO-market equilibrium p. In t6is equilib-
rium agreement is reached and given by
r(1 - a) f c(1 - ,0)
p- 2-a-Q ~
Proof: From the customer's and the supplier's disagreement points, and the
assumption that pe - p, the outcome of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution
is defined by (10) if r 1 p. Since r ~ c, the customer's disagreement point is non-
negative. Therefore, the customer's disagreement point equals "vB - a(r - p)
and the first inequality in (i) is satisfied. Straightforward manipulations show
that the second inequality is always satisfied. Therefore, v" ~ 0 and agreement
is reached. Finally, if p - pe, the solution to Eq. ( 10) is unique and equals Eq.
(11). o
Equation (11) is independent of the probability b with which customers enter
the market. The intuition of this observation is the following: once a customer
has entered the market, the supplier ranking in front of the queue knows with
certainty he will be matched again with this customer in the event of disagree-
ment. That is, the customer is locked in forever. Therefore, the probability
of a new customer entering the market becomes completely irrelevant. Equa-
tion (11) is also independent of the number of suppliers in the queue. Again,
the intuition is that if a customer enters the market, the supplier ranking in
front of the queue is matched with certainty. Consequently, the total number
of suppliers plays no role.
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A comparison of the prices in the two regimes yields that p) p: the outcome
of the negotiation in the FIFO-market is at least as high as in the random-
market. The intuition behind this result is simple: the random-system implies
more degrees of freedom for the customers. As a result, customers are relatively
in a better bargaining position. The equality sign holds if N- 1. It also holds
if N - 2 and ó- 1. In both these scenarios, the supplier knows for sure he will
be matched in the next period. This gives him effectively a bilateral monopoly
situation as in the FIFO-market. In the limit, when Q-~ 1, the two equilibrium
prices converge to the reservation value r. Similarly, when a-~ 1, both prices
converge to the marginal cost c.
So far, the analysis has assumed that either the random- or the FIFO-regime
are available. Suppose, however, that both regimes operate. Customers can dis-
tinguish and may costlessly choose between the random- and the FIFO-regime.
Obviously, customers will select a supplier in the random-regime as the nego-
tiated outcome there is never larger than in the FIFO-regime. Consequently,
all the FIFO-suppliers have no chance of making positive profits. They find it
optimal to join the random-regime. The FIFO-suppliers, however, survive when
both stands are separated and customers cannot choose regime. The following
section demonstrates that this is, indeed, the case: suppliers face a trade-off
between the two market organizations.
5.5 Stability of Market Organization
Sections 3 and 4 assume that customers and suppliers cannot choose the regime.
This section assumes that there is a random- and a FIFO-market organization.
Before the markets open, every supplier chooses once and for all which system
he will join. Customers, however, cannot choose between the two systems. The
two market organizations, therefore, are completely separated. One interpreta-
tion may be that customers do not know in advance where they will arrive. In
addition, they cannot switch from one regime to the other; prohibitive switch-
ing costs or ignorance about the existence of another stand offer a reasonable
economic justification for this assumption. This section deals with the stability
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of the two market organizations against each other. A market organization is
said to be stable against the other only if no supplier can gain by switching to
the other market organization, given the decision of all other suppliers. The
supplier's decision whether to join a particular market organization or not de-
pends on his expected payoff. Before providing a precise definition of stability
of market organization, we compute the suppliers' expected payoffs for the two
market organizations.
Let Nl be the number of suppliers joining the random-system. Similarly,
let Nz - N - Nl be the number of suppliers joining the FIFO-system. As
computed in 5ection 3, each supplier's expected payoff from agreement in the
random-market equals ws as in Eq. (2) with p~ - p. Therefore,
,d,s(Nl) - ó(P - c)
N,(1 - (1 - ó~1V,)Q)~
(12)
Market frictions allow suppliers to make positive profits. These profits increase
when Q becomes larger, but decrease with a. Equation (12) holds for every
supplier in the random-market and depends on the total number of suppliers.
It is decreasing in the number of suppliers Nl, but increasing in ê.
The expected payoff vs(r), with r- 1, ..., N2i for a supplier in the FIFO-
market depends on his position in the queue. The supplier first in rank expects
with probability ó a payoff of p- c at the beginning of the current period.
With the remaining probability, no customer has entered the market. In that
case, he discounts his expected payoff v'S(1) of the next period. Accordingly,
vs(1) - ó(p - c) -~ (1 - ó)Qvs(1)
or
ó(p - c)
vs(1) - 1 - (1 - ó)Q~ (13)
Similarly, the supplier with position 2 c T C NZ has, in the beginning of the
same current period, an expected discounted payoff of
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vS(T) - Q(bvs(T - 1) f(I - ó)vS(T))
or,
vs(T ) - I - (~ó- ó)Qv5(T
- I)
so that, given Eq. (13) the recursive solution of Eq. (14) equals
vg(T) - QT-1[I - (1 - ó)Q~T(p - c).
(14)
(15)
Equation (15) is decreasing in the supplier's position r in the queue. In contrast
with the random-market, a supplier's expected payoffdepends on the number
of suppliers in front of him; not on the total number of suppliers in the FIFO-
market. The suppliers' profits in the FIFO-regime are increasing in ó. In the
limit when ê-~ 1 or Q-. 1, the term between square brackets approaches one.
Profits are positive in the presence of market frictions. In particular, they are
increasing in Q but decreasing in a.
Equations (12) and (15) become identical for Nl - T- 1. In words, suppose
there is only one supplier in the random-market. This supplier has exactly
the same expected discounted profit as the supplier in the FIFO-market with
position one. Obviously, when N- 1, the supplier is indifferent between the
two regimes. The rest of the analysis, however, assumes N 1 2. In addition,
to keep the analysis as tractable as possible, assume that c- 0. Before stating
the following proposition define the functions
F~(N~) - (1
- (1 - ó)Q)P(N~) (16)
- (N~(I - Q) f Qó)P
(1 -(1-ó),Q)(2-a-Q)









- ((Ni f 1)(1 - Q) ~ Qb)P
Qb(2-~-Q)
-(2 - o)(Ni f 1)(1 - Q) ~ Qb) - R(1 - Q-~ b),
(18)
where p(Nl) and p(Nl f 1) denote the outcome of the random-market equilib-
rium with Nl and Nl ~- 1 suppliers, respectively. The three functions are posi-
tively valued. The function F2(-) is increasing and reaches its maximum value
of one at Nl - N. Note that Fl(.) and F3(.) are decreasing and FI(1) - 1.
Moreover, we unambiguously have that Fl(Nl) ~ F3(Nl).
Definition 3: The random- and the FIFO-market form an ( Nl, N2)-equilibrium
if Nl and N2 are such that (i) ws(Nl) ) vs(N2-F1) and (ii) `vs(NZ) 1 ws(Nl f 1).
Part (i) of this definition guarantees that no supplier in the random-market
has an incentive to switch to the FIFO-market. It assumes that this supplier,
when switching to the FIFO-regime, is appointed the last position in the queue.
If part (ii) also holds, no supplier in the FIFO-regime gains by deviating to the
random-regime. Since 'vs(r) is decreasing, it suffices to consider the supplier
with position T - N2.
Proposition 3: In any (Nl, N2)-equilibrium it is the case that Nl ~ 0, NZ 1 0;
i.e. there are suppliers in both markets.
Proof: Conditions ( i) and (ii) in Definition 3 hold if and only if Fl(Nl) ~
F2(Nl) ~ F3(Nl). Suppose N2 - 0, from which the second term equals one,
whereas the first and third term are less than one since, by assumption, N~ 2.
Therefore, the first inequality can never be satisfied if N2 - 0. Suppose now
that Nl - 0. Since we now have that NZ ~ 2, the supplier with the last position
certainly has an incentive to deviate: a random-market with only one supplier
effectively becomes a bilateral monopoly and replicates the FIFO-regime. These
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findings imply that there exists no (Nl, N2)-equilibrium with Nl - 0 or NZ - 0.
~
In essence, Proposition 3 shows that, there is no (Nl, NZ)-equilibrium with
all suppliers operating in one or the other regime. Although the FIFO-market
yields higher prices, it is still profitable for part of the suppliers to operate in the
random-market. The supplier with the last position in the queue faces a trade-
off between the two regimes. On the one hand, sticking to the FIFO-market
yíelds a high price, but the waiting time can be very costly. On the other hand,
switching to the random-market drastically decreases the expected waiting time,
but results in a lower negotiated outcome. A similar argument goes through
for every supplier in the random-market. In equilibrium, no supplier has an
incentive to switch regime.
Proposition 4: For each fixed tota] number of suppliers N there exists an
(Nl, N2)-equilibrium.
Proof: Denote by Nl the value of Nl for which Fl(Nl) - FZ(Nl). Similarly, let
Nl be the value of Nl for which Fz(Nl) - F3(Nl). We know that Fl(1) - 1~
F2(1). Since Fl(Nl) ~ 0, Fi(Nl) G 0, and F2(Nl) 1 0 we have that Fi(Nl) )
FZ(Nl) for all Nl G N1 and Fl(Nl) G F2(Nl) if Nl 1 N1. Since F3(Nl) G 0
and Fl(Nl) 1 F3(Nl), there exists at most one N1 such that Fz(Nl) C F3(Nl)
fora11N1GN1andF2(Nl)1F3(Nl)ifN11N1. SinceNl2andF1(Nl)is
unambiguously larger than F3(Nl) it follows that 1 G Nl G Nl G N. Therefore,
for any N there always exists a value of Nl such that Nl C NI G Nl. These
values of Nl satisfies condition ( i) and ( ii) of Definition 3. ~
Proposition 4 ignores any integer problem, and states that there is always a
combination of Nl and N2 such that no supplier has an incentive to switch to
the other regime. There is always a lowest (Nl) and highest (Nl) number of
suppliers in the random-market supporting an equilibrium. Any combination of
suppliers with Nl between these two bounds satisfies the equilibrium conditions.
Since Nl - N - N2, one could also establish Proposition 4 in terms of N2,
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the number of suppliers in the FIFO-regime. The Eqs. ( 16) -(18) can then be
expressed as a function of N2. The functions Fl(.) and F3(.) are now increasing
in N2, while F2(N2) is decreasing. Use of the same notation and construction
of an analogous proof shows that for any N there always exists a value of N2
suchthatlGN2GN2CN2GN.
Proposition 5: If N increases, then the lowest and highest number of suppliers
in both the random-market and FIFO-market that form an (Nl, N2)-equilibrium
also increase.
Proof: An increase in N implies a downwards shift for FZ(.). The functions
Fl(-) and F3(.), however, are not affected. From the properties of Fi(.) it
follows that N1 also increases. Similarly, a decrease in F2(-) shifts the point
of intersection with F3(.) to the right so that Nl augments. Therefore, the
lowest and highest number of suppliers in the random-market increases with
N. To prove the increases in the FIFO-market, substitute Nl for N- Nz in
Eqs. (17) -(19). An increase in N does not affect F2(.), while the functions
Fl(.) and F3(.) are shifted downwards. From the properties of these functions,
it follows that both Nz and NZ augment when N increases. ~
Proposition 5 demonstrates that in any (Nl, NZ)-equilibrium, an increase in the
total number of suppliers augments the lower and upper bound of the num-
ber of suppliers in both regimes. This result has the following intuition: an
increase in the number of suppliers in the random-market decreases its prof-
itability. Therefore, the cut-off point of profitability at which suppliers still join
the FIFO-market without an incentive for switching also decreases. By conse-
quence, the possible lowest and highest number of suppliers in the FIFO-market
also increases. The same intuition holds when the number of suppliers in the
FIFO-market increases.
Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 4 and 5. The horizontal axis depicts the
number of suppliers in the FIFO-market. The vertical axis shows the number
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n N
Figure 1: The (Nl, N2)-equilibrium.
of suppliers in the random-market. On the straight line NN, the total number
of suppliers N remains constant. On the higher straight line N'N' the total
number of suppliers equals N', with N' ~ N. There is an (Nl, N2)-equilibrium
for every combination of Nl and NZ in the dotted region. Proposition 4 shows
that each line along which the total number of suppliers is constant crosses
the dotted region. Proposition 5 establishes that when the total number of
suppliers increases, the lowest and highest equilibríum number of suppliers in
each regime also increase. When the number of suppliers becomes larger and
larger, the lowest and highest number of suppliers supporting an equilibrium
approach each other. In the limit when N goes to infinity, the dotted region
shrinks to a single line. Figure 1 illustrates that N G N'; and N; C N';, with
i - 1,2.
The suppliers' decision to join one or the other regime depends on the rel-
ative values of the underlying parameters. The functions Fl(~) and F3(.) are
increasing in a, while FZ(.) remains unchanged. Therefore, the values for Nl
and Nl are decreasing when the customers become more and more patient.
The values of 1Y2 and N2, by consequence, are increasing when the customers'
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degree of patíence augments. However, when the customers become infinitely
patient as a equals one, prices in both regimes approach zero, so that suppliers
are indifferent. The values for Nl and Nl are also decreasing in Q. As the
suppliers' patience increases, the FIFO-regime becomes more profitable than
the random-regime. Of course, when the suppliers do not discount the future
anymore, they are indifferent between the two regimes. To see this observe that
in the limit when Q~ 1, prices in both regimes approach r. The Eqs. (16),
(17), and ( 18) then converge to 1, so that every (Nl, N2)-combination satisfies
Definition 3. A higher probability ó with which a new customer enters the
market also favors the equilibrium number of suppliers in the FIFO-regime.
When N is relatively small, the cost of waiting before serving a customer is
relatively low for the FIFO-supplier with the last position. This favors the
number of suppliers joining the FIFO-regime. As N becomes larger, however,
the cost of waiting becomes fairly high. As a consequence, for large enough N
more suppliers prefer to join the random-regime per supplier joining the FIFO-
regime. The following proposition states that in the limit, when N-~ oo, the
rate between NI and N2 approaches infinity.
Proposition 6: When Nl ~-NZ -~ oo, we find that for any ( Nl, N2)-equilibrium
Nl ~NZ -~ oo.
Proof: Condition (i) and (ii) in Definition 3 hold if and only if




Q(1 - (1 - a)b - Q)
(2 - a)(1 - Q)
} (1 - (1 - ó)Q)(2 - a - Q), ~ ,Oó 1 N'
(2-a)(1-Q) 1-(1-ó),Q)J
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Figure 2: The functions y~l(.) and y~Z(.)
Qó(2 - ~ - p) Qb "2
~(2 - a)(1 - p), (1 - (1 - b)Q)) ~
Since lim,v2y~ cp;(NZ) - oo and ó2cp;(N2)~óN2 ~ 0 for all N, one has lim,v2y~
[cp;(N2)~N2] - oo, for i- 1,2. For any N1~N2 satisfying Eq. (19), this implies
N1~Nz -~ oo as N2 -~ oo. As N goes to infinity, in any (Nl, NZ)-equilibrium
N1~N2 must go to infinity. o




This chapter has studied how in a market with switching costs the organization
of supply influences the bargaining outcome. Supply is offered simultaneously
in the random-market. In such a market, a customer can randomly pick any
supplier. Supply is offered according to the `first-in first-out' (FIFO) principle
in a market with sequential supply. In such a FIFO-market a customer picks
the supplier in front of the queue. The negotiated outcome in the random-
market results from a partial bilateral monopoly situation. With sequential
supply, however, customer and supplier are involved in a bilateral monopoly.
The FIFO-market, therefore, leads to a higher negotiated outcome than with
simultaneous supply. Suppliers, however, do not always prefer the FIFO-market.
When the two market organizations are present and customers cannot choose
one or the other, the supplier with the last position in the FIFO-market trades
off the cost of waiting time against the higher negotiated outcome. If suppliers
can choose either to join one or the other regime, the market equilibrium has
the property that there are always suppliers in both regimes.
A number of important assumptions have been made in this chapter. First,
customers could not choose between the market organizations. Obviously, as
already mentioned at the end of Section 5.4, customers choose that market
organization offering the lowest negotiated outcome. A costless choice between
these two market organizations, therefore, gives the FIFO-suppliers no chance
of making positive profits.
Second, the chapter assumes that both regimes operate. Suppliers can only
choose which regime to join. If the suppliers could ex ante coordinate on the
type of market organization, they would certainly choose the one with the high-
est expected payoff per supplier. To see this, consider two stands A and B.
Assume suppliers can in some way or another choose whether to be organized
as a random- or FIFO-market. Suppose stand A chooses the random-system
and stand B chooses the FIFO-system and Ni ) NB; that is, the number of
suppliers is higher in the random-market. Of course, given stand A's choice of
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organization, the suppliers at stand B can improve their profits by transform-
ing their stand into a random-market. In that case, the number of suppliers
becomes the same at both stands. By consequence, the number of suppliers at
stand A must decrease. In other words, the expected discounted profit goes up
at stand A, and therefore also at stand B. A similar argument applies when
Ni G NB: suppliers at stand A can improve their profits when becoming a
FIFO-market. This, however, does not rule out that both organizations can
never operate simultaneously. Owners of a stand, such as airports, sell licenses
to taxis. The owner maximizes the total expected pay-off of the stand. A priori,
it is not impossible that each owner maximizes his payoffs when both systems
operate.
Third, this model has assumed that suppliers get with probability one the
last position in the FIFO-system. If other possible positions receive positive
weight, joining the FIFO-system certainly becomes more attractive.
Fourth, every customer has an identical reservation value. This assumption
is partly responsible for immediate agreement. Differences across customers
with respect to their reservation values, however, could give rise to disagreement.
The reason for rejection may be that a supplier expects a better deal to arrive
in the future. Disagreement could also occur when the reservation value is not
commonly known.
Fifth, the optimal number of suppliers and waiting time issues have not been
addressed.ll In this model, the arrival process of customers implies that every
number of suppliers waiting in line exceeding one constitutes a social waste. A
more elaborate model, e.g. with demand effects, would be wellcomed to address
social welfare issues in more detail.
Finally, other scenarios such as the already mentioned tour de róle system on
the North-South inland waterways transport market could be looked at in more
~ISee Beesley and Glaister (1983), Brunstad (1991), and Burdett and Fdlster (1994) for an
analysis of these issues in the cruising taxi market.
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detail. Upon disagreement, a shipper switches to the second barge in the queue.
The first bargeman, however, keeps his position in front of the queue. In such
a scenario, the bargeman's disagreement point equals vs - max[0, ~3b(pe - c)]
since a new entering shipper enters with probability b. It can easily be shown
that for high enough 6, or N~,0[(2 -~3 - b)~(1 - Q)b] the negotiated outcome
of the tour de róle system always results in a higher price. When b-~ l, the
tour de róle system approaches the framework used in the current chapter. This
model, therefore, illustrates that when the probability of arrival of a shipment
is high enough, such a tour de róle system could be judged as a restrictive
practice.
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Summary in Dut ch
Het essay `Phonebanking' bestudeert het effect van een nieuwe transactie-
technologie op de competitie tussen twee banken. Deze twee financiële instelling-
en maximaliseren hun winsten door deposito's aan te trekken. De depositohoud-
ers bevinden zich in een geografische ruimte (een cirkel) en hebben een aantal
banktransacties te verrichten. Sommige van deze transacties vereisen een be-
zoek aan het bankkantoor. De kost van elk bezoek aan het bankkantoor stijgt
met de afstand tussen het bankkantoor en de woonplaats van de depositohouder.
Andere transacties vereisen geen bezoek aan het kantoor en kunnen op afstand,
bv. per telefoon, afgehandeld worden. Dit noemen we `telefoonbankieren'. De
kost van zo'n transactie is onafhankelijk van de afstand tussen het bankkantoor
en de woonplaats van de depositohouder. De kost van telefoonbankieren is voor
elke depositohouder lager dan een bezoek aan het bankkantoor. Met andere
woorden, indien voor een bepaalde transactie bankieren per telefoon mogelijk
is, dan verkiest elke depositohouder dit boven een bezoek aan zijn kantoor.
Het aanbieden van de optie telefoonbankieren betekent dus voor elke deposi-
tohouder een verhoging in de aangeboden kwaliteit. De twee banken hebben
een vaste locatie op de cirkel en concurreren met elkaar als volgt: in een eerste
fase beslist elke bank over het al dan niet aanbieden van de optie telefoon-
bankieren. Wanneer deze beslissing genomen en bekend is concurreren de twee
banken met elkaar op basis van interestvoeten. Het aanbieden van de optie
telefoonbankieren creëert twee effecten die diametraal tegenover elkaar staan.
Het eerste effect is een `vraageffect': elke bank die de optie telefoonbankieren
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aanbiedt, beïnvloedt op een positieve manier zijn marktaandeel. De verklaring
is dat elke depositohouder een kost van een transactie per telefoon verkiest
boven de kost van een verplaatsing naar het bankkantoor. Het tweede effect
is het `strategisch effect': de optie telefoonbankieren wakkert de competitie in
interestvoeten aan. De verklaring is dat een verlaging van de transactiekosten
de twee banken `dichter' bij elkaar brengt. Anders gezegd, de depositohouders
beschouwen de twee banken als meer substitueerbaar voor elkaar. Dit leidt tot
scherpere concurrentie in interestvoeten. Wanneer dit strategisch effect domi-
neert, dan zal geen van beide banken de optie telefoonbankieren aanbieden. Het
omgekeerde geldt wanneer het vraageffect domineert. In dat geval bieden beide
banken de optie aan. Slechts één van beide banken biedt de optie aan indien
er een relatief groot vraageffect is in combinatie met een gematigd strategisch
effect.
Het essay `Monopolistic Competition with a Mail Order Business' is in ter-
men van opzet nauw gerelateerd aan het hierboven beschreven essay. Deze
tweede bijdrage analyseert een markt met homogene goederen. Bedrijven hebben
twee opties om hun waar aan de man brengen. De eerste optie is het openen
van een winkel. De kost voor de consument van een aankoop in een winkel stijgt
met de (fysische) afstand tussen die winkel en de woonplaats van de consument.
De andere optie is het openen van een postorderbedrijf. Deze verkoopstrate-
gie impliceert dat de consument een vaste kost betaalt voor zijn aankoop bij
het postorderbedrijf. Met andere woorden, de kost van aankoop is voor de
consument onafhankelijk van de (fysische) afstand tussen de consument en het
postorderbedrijf. Net zoals in het eerste essay bevinden de consumenten zich
op een cirkel. Bedrijven die een winkel openen krijgen een locatie op de cirkel
toegewezen. Het middelpunt van de cirkel is een interpretatie voor de locatie
van een postorderbedrijf: de kost van de (fysische) afstand tussen elke con-
sument en een postorderbedrijf is identiek. De opzet is als volgt: in een eerste
fase beslist elk bedrijf om al dan niet toe te treden tot de markt. Daarna beslist
elk bedrijf op welke manier ze haar waar aan de man brengt: via een winkel
of via een postorderbedrijf. In een derde fase concurreren de bedrijven met
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elkaar door middel van prijzen. De belangrijkste resultaten van dit essay zijn:
er bestaat ten hoogste één postorderbedrijf. De intuitie is dat twee of ineer pos-
torderbedrijven geen enkele ruimte vinden om zich van elkaar te differentiëren.
Bijgevolg concurreren ze zichzelf kapot. Het openen van een winkel garandeert
echter voldoende differentiatie van elke ander winkel. Het is dus nooit optimaal
om als postorderbedrijf te concurreren met een ander postorderbedrijf. Een
ander inzicht is dat het postorderbedrijf inet elke winkel concurreert. Omge-
keerd concurreert elke winkel met hetzelfde postorderbedrijf. Figuur drie op
pag. 59 illustreert dit duidelijk: het postorderbedrijf wringt zichzelf tussen elk
paar winkels op de cirkel. De consumenten die relatief ver van elke winkel wonen
verkiezen hun waar bij het postorderbedrijf te kopen. Tenslotte, de mogelijk-
heid om de aangeboden waar via een postorderbedrijf te verkopen verhoogt de
concurrentie. Het hoger aantal bedrijven dat tot de bedrijfstak wenst toe te
treden indien er geen postorderbedrijf toegelaten wordt maakt dit duidelijk.
Het derde essay heet `Price Competition between an Expert and a Non-
expert'. Een hoeveelheid consumenten probeert elk tegen minimale kosten bv.
een goed te herstellen. Elke consument heeft twee mogelijkheden. De eerste
mogelijkheid is om onmiddellijk aan te kloppen bij de vakman (de expert): hij
repareert het defecte goed met zekerheid. De andere mogelijkheid is om de
klusjesman (de non-expert) uit te proberen. Deze klusjesman repareert het
defecte goed slechts met een bepaalde (bekende) kans. Indien na het bezoek
blijkt dat de klusjesman niet in staat was het defecte goed te herstellen, is
een tweede bezoek bij hem volledig nutteloos: de consument weet nu dat de
klusjesman het in geen geval kan herstellen. Er rest deze consument nog slechts
één mogelijkheid: de vakman. De consument moet dus een optimale beslissing
maken tussen (i) kiezen voor zekerheid door onmiddellijk bij de vakman aan te
kloppen maar tegen een hoge prijs, of (ii) zijn kans wagen bij de klusjesman
tegen een lage prijs maar met het risico dat een bezoek aan de vakman toch
nog nodig zal zijn. De consumenten bevinden zich op een lijnstuk en betalen
een transportkost om zich naar de vakman of de klusjesman te begeven. Deze
transportkost stijgt met de af te leggen afstand. De vakman bevindt zich aan
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het ene, de klusjesman bevindt zich aan het andere uiteinde van dit lijnstuk. De
vakman staat voor de volgende beslissing: ofwel vraagt hij een heel hoge prijs
waardoor elke consument beslist om eerst bij de klusjesman aan te kloppen. In
dat geval bedient hij enkel die consumenten die bij de klusjesman geen geluk
hadden. De andere keuze is een agressieve prijs vragen. In dat geval zijn er toch
nog consumenten die het optimaal vinden om onmiddellijk bij de vakman aan te
kloppen. De vakman zal een agressieve prijs zetten wanneer de kans op succesvol
herstel bij de klusjesman voldoende hoog is. Immers, het aantal consumenten
dat geen geluk had bij de klusjesman is heel laag. Dit maakt het vragen van een
hoge prijs heel onaantrekkelijk voor de vakman. Wanneer de kans op succesvol
herstel bij de klusjesman laag is, dan wordt het voor de vakman aantrekkelijk
om een hogere prijs te vragen. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de vakman met een
bepaalde kans de monopolieprijs zal vragen. Met de andere kans zet hij een
lage prijs. Vanuit efficiëntie-oogpunt is er nog het volgende inzicht: wanneer
de vakman een kostennadeel ondervindt gaan te weinig consumenten eerst naar
de klusjesman. Het omgekeerde gebeurt wanneer er geen kostenverschillen zijn
tussen de vakman en de klusjesman. Deze bijdrage kan ook gezien worden als
een eerste aanzet om de effecten van verwijzing (Nederland) of echelonering
(België) te bestuderen in de zorgverstrekkende sector.
Essay vier is getiteld `Bargaining in Markets with Simultaneous and Sequen-
tial Suppliers' en vergelijkt twee marktorganizaties waar verkopers (bv. taxi-
chauffeurs) wachten op klanten. In de ene marktorganisatie (de random-markt)
kan een klant met om het even welke verkoper een transactie afsluiten. Indien
de twee partijen niet tot een overeenkomst kunnen komen, dan kan de klant in
de volgende periode naar om het even welke verkoper toestappen om een trans-
actie af te sluiten. In de andere marktorganisatie (de FIFO-markt) moet de
klant de volgorde van de rij wachtende verkopers respecteren: de verkoper die
vooraan in de rij staat heeft het recht om met de eerste klant een transactie af te
sluiten. De klant heeft niet het recht om een andere verkoper te kiezen. Indien
de twee partijen geen overeenkomst kunnen bereiken, dan blijft de klant in de
volgende periode toegewezen aan diezelfde verkoper. Er wordt verondersteld
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dat alle klanten dezelfde karakteristieken vertonen. Daarenboven komt er per
tijdseenheid ten hoogste één klant binnen. Het aantal verkopers wordt constant
gehouden. De prijs komt tot stand via bilaterale onderhandeling. De onderhan-
delingsprijs heeft als kenmerk dat beide partijen de helft van het beschikbare
surplus krijgen. Het onderhandelingsproces wordt echter niet gemodelleerd. De
belangrijkste resultaten zijn: de onderhandelde prijs in de random-markt is
nooit hoger dan de onderhandelde prijs in de FIFO-markt. De intuitie is dat
de onderhandelingen in de random-markt het kenmerk hebben van een par-
tieel bilateraal monopolie: de klant kan in de volgende periode naar een andere
verkoper overstappen. Dit maakt dat de klant een lagere prijs kan afdwing-
en. In de FIFO-markt kan de klant dit niet afdwingen: vermits de klant bij
dezelfde verkoper moet blijven komt de prijs tussen de klant en de verkoper
tot stand in een context van een bilateraal monopolie. Wanneer beide markt-
organisaties aanwezig zijn en de klanten niet kunnen kiezen in welk systeem ze
zullen belanden, dan blijft de random-markt niettegenstaande haar lagere prijs
altijd aantrekkelijk. Een lange wachtrij betekent voor de FIFO-verkoper met
de laatste positie een kostbare wachttijd. Deze verkoper weegt de hoge prijs
en kostbare wachttijd van de FIFO-markt af tegen de lagere prijs en minder
dure wachttijd van de random-markt. Wanneer het aantal verkopers laag is,
dan verkiest een relatief hoog aantal verkopers de FIFO-markt. Wanneer het
aantal verkopers heel hoog wordt, verkiest een relatief hoog aantal verkopers de
random-markt.
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